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ABSTRACT
Low-overhead Online Code Transformations
by
Michael A. Laurenzano
Chairs: Jason Mars and Lingjia Tang
The ability to perform online code transformations – to dynamically change the
implementation of running native programs – has been shown to be useful in domains
as diverse as optimization, security, debugging, resilience and portability. However,
conventional techniques for performing online code transformations carry significant
runtime overhead, limiting their applicability for performance-sensitive applications.
This dissertation proposes and investigates a novel low-overhead online code transfor-
mation technique that works by running the dynamic compiler asynchronously and
in parallel to the running program. As a consequence, this technique allows programs
to execute with the online code transformation capability at near-native speed, un-
locking a host of additional opportunities that can take advantage of the ability to
re-visit compilation choices as the program runs.
This dissertation builds on the low-overhead online code transformation mecha-
nism, describing three novel runtime systems that represent in best-in-class solutions
to three challenging problems facing modern computer scientists. First, I leverage
online code transformations to significantly increase the utilization of multicore dat-
x
acenter servers by dynamically managing program cache contention. Compared to
state-of-the-art prior work that mitigate contention by throttling application execu-
tion, the proposed technique achieves a 1.3-1.5× improvement in application per-
formance. Second, I build a technique to automatically configure and parameterize
approximate computing techniques for each program input. This technique results
in the ability to configure approximate computing to achieve an average performance
improvement of 10.2× while maintaining 90% result accuracy, which significantly im-
proves over oracle versions of prior techniques. Third, I build an operating system
designed to secure running applications from dynamic return oriented programming
attacks by efficiently, transparently and continuously re-randomizing the code of run-
ning programs. The technique is able to re-randomize program code at a frequency
of 300ms with an average overhead of 9%, a frequency fast enough to resist state-of-
the-art return oriented programming attacks based on memory disclosures and side
channels.
xi
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Compilation is the process of turning code written in a high-level language into
machine code instructions and data that can be understood by the machine. The job
of the compiler is to ensure correctness, producing machine code that faithfully imple-
ments the source code specified by the programmer. However, correctness is just the
beginning of what the modern compiler must do. There may be many machine code
implementations of source code that are correct, and today’s programmers rely heav-
ily on the compiler to produce machine code that executes efficiently on the hardware
platform. To achieve this efficiency the compiler makes a number of assumptions
about the execution environment of the program. For example, differences in the L1
cache sizes among hardware platforms may cause the compiler to optimize locality
by structuring code to use a different memory access pattern via a customized tiling
optimization [99, 177]. The assumptions a compiler must make about a program’s
runtime environment are not limited just to the features of the hardware platform,
also including the makeup and size of program inputs as well as the impact of other
running programs and services on the system.
As a result of these assumptions and the rigidity they impose on software in terms
of dealing with different runtime environments, there has been a wealth of prior work
aiming to enable online code transformations to allow the assumptions made by the
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compiler, and the resulting machine code, to be changed as the program’s execution
environment changes [16, 17, 29, 40, 41, 59, 91, 92, 98, 107, 109, 143, 152, 164, 169, 170,
173, 184, 190]. Although the roots of online code transformation are in performance
optimization, there has since been a wide spectrum of other important use cases
that have been shown in the literature. The main classes of use cases for online code
transformations is depicted in Figure 1.1. Online code transformations have been used
to enact security measures [175], improve the resilience of software to errors [64], to
build debugging tools [87], and to facilitate software portability, enabling programs
compiled for one machine to run on another [43,53,59].
Despite these prior efforts, dynamic compilation has not been widely adopted and
put into continuous operation in performance-sensitive production and commercial
domains. This dissertation argues that the key to facilitating adoption is to realize
a mechanism for online code transformation that introduces low performance over-
head, is platform-agnostic, has the full transformative power of a static compiler, and
is capable of extrospectively examining the program’s execution environment as the
program runs. This motivates us to design a new approach to online code transfor-
mations that overcomes these challenges, and to investigate the implications of our
approach on two important use cases for online code transformations – optimization
and security.
1.1 Motivation
This section motivates the need for a deployable, low-overhead technique for online
code transformations in the context of two critical problems that exist in today’s
computer systems.
2
Optimization
SecurityResilience
Debugging Portability
Online Code 
Transformations
Figure 1.1: Online code transformations have a range of uses, including optimization,
security, portability, resilience and debugging. This dissertation proposes a new low-
overhead online code transformation technique and its implications on performance
and security
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1.1.1 Datacenter Server Utilization
Large enterprises such as Google and Facebook build and maintain large data-
centers known as Warehouse Scale Computers (WSCs) dedicated to hosting popular
user-facing webservices along with a variety of support applications. These data-
centers are expensive and resource-intensive, with price tags now being measured in
the billions of dollars [118, 121] and energy demands that require dedicated power
plants. Maximizing the efficiency of compute resources in modern WSCs is an im-
portant challenge rooted in finding ways to consistently maximize server utilization
to minimize cost.
Many datacenters run a mix of high-priority, often latency-sensitive, applications,
such as web search and social networking, along with low-priority applications. The
strategy of co-locating multiple applications on a single server has proved critical
for maximizing utilization and minimizing cost [54, 113–115]. However, a significant
challenge that emerges from the unpredictable dynamism in WSCs and limits our
ability to co-locate is the threat of violating the quality of service (QoS) of user-
facing latency-sensitive applications. Sources of dynamism include:
1. fluctuating user demand (load) for user-facing applications,
2. highly variable co-locations between user-facing and batch applications on a
given machine, and
3. constant turnaround on each server; when an application completes, new appli-
cations are mapped to the server.
To deal with the threat of QoS violations, sophisticated software systems have
been used to mitigate the effects of dynamism, acting to maximize server utilization
while minimizing QoS violations [54, 114, 115, 170, 179, 180]. State-of-the-art runtime
systems [170,180] solve the QoS problem by introducing short naps into the execution
4
stream of the low-priority application, unilaterally reducing the pressure on all shared
resources in order to allow the high-priority application to make faster progress. Re-
QoS [170], for example, is a static compiler-enabled dynamic approach that throttles
low-priority applications to allow them to be safely co-located with high-priority co-
runners, guaranteeing the QoS of the high-priority co-runners and improving server
utilization.
Such software systems are well-suited to improving server utilization, allowing
some progress to be made on low-priority batch applications while guaranteeing QoS
in latency-sensitive applications. This style of approach works well at meeting applica-
tion QoS targets because there is some level of nap intensity that hinders low-priority
applications enough to allow high-priority applications to meet their QoS targets.
However, due to the inability to transform application code online, these approaches
are limited to using the heavy handed approach of putting the batch application to
sleep, i.e., napping, to reduce pressure on shared resources.
A capability missing in the WSC system software stack is the ability to dynami-
cally transform and re-transform executing application code, which limits the design
space when designing solutions to deal with the dynamism found in WSCs and leads
to missed optimization opportunities. An example of such an optimization is to apply
software non-temporal memory access hints to an application code to reduce its cache
allocation and protect the QoS of its user-facing latency-sensitive co-runners. Modern
ISAs, such as x86 and ARMv8 [2, 3], include prefetch instructions that hint to the
processor that a subsequent memory access should not be cached. This instruction
provides a mechanism that can cause an application to occupy more or less shared
cache, and thus can enable higher throughput co-locations while protecting the QoS
of high priority co-runners. However, it is difficult to leverage these hints effectively
without a continuously-available low-overhead a mechanism to dynamically add and
remove them in response to changing conditions on the server.
5
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77%
Figure 1.2: One approximation approach (16x8 tiling [146]) produces
outputs of very different quality across inputs
1.1.2 Approximate Computing
The emergence of applications in the domains of image and sound processing, com-
puter vision, machine learning, and data mining significantly increase the processing
demands on compute infrastructure as the usage of wearable technologies [71,117,128]
and intelligent personal assistants [9, 72, 119] rises. These emerging applications rely
heavily on regularly-structured computations on inputs such images, video, and sound,
and have loose constraints on the quality of output. The need for significant improve-
ments in processing throughput for these applications along with loose quality con-
straints make them ideal candidates for approximate computing, where small amounts
of output accuracy can be traded for large improvements in performance or energy.
The general purpose software-based approximate computing techniques typically
applied to regularly-structured computations, such as loop perforation [84, 140], al-
gorithm selection [8,55], and numerical approximation [81], have been important and
successful vehicles for realizing approximation in practice. These approaches can
6
be realized on commodity hardware, apply to a variety of problem types, and are
straightforward for programmers to implement. However, the performance improve-
ments achieved by prior work, 1.1× to 4× [15,84,85,116,142,146,147,159], has been
regarded as the ceiling on the performance and energy gains that are possible [35].
To breach this ceiling and realize the full potential of approximate computing,
this work reconsiders how to approximate and observes that prior work falls into two
categories.
Category #1: Calibration Intensive. Calibration computes both exact and
approximate results and compares them to measure the accuracy of the approximate
approach on some (set of) problem inputs. Calibration has been used to drive offline
approaches [84], runtime systems [147], and within systems that use a combination of
the two [15]. Because it is expensive to compute the exact solution and the accuracy of
the approximate solution(s) on every input, calibration must be used sparingly. This
approach encumbers the flexibility of approximation and ultimately the performance
gains that can be realized.
Category #2: Profile Dependent. Profile guided approaches [63, 85, 159] make
approximation decisions based on average or worst case behavior of a set of training
inputs. This class of approaches relies on training with inputs that are representative
of real-world inputs, which may be difficult to achieve in practice.
The key insight of this work is that, common to both classes of approaches, one
approximation is used to cover multiple inputs. Those that focus on worst case ac-
curacy can result in overly conservative approximation for many inputs, while those
that focus on average case accuracy may be overly aggressive and fail to deliver suf-
ficient accuracy in the worst case. As we show in this work, designing approximation
systems that discount the differences between inputs hinders both the performance
and accuracy of software-based approximation.
In this work, we present an approach to addressing this limitation that is guided by
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two observations. Firstly, the accuracy of approximate programs can depend heavily
on program input. Consider the example presented in Figure 1.2, which shows two
images that have been processed by an identical approximate gamma correction with
results that are of wildly different quality. Typical approaches to dealing with this
difference in quality would dial down the aggressiveness of the approximation for
both images, sacrificing performance for the first to produce satisfactory accuracy for
the second. Addressing this problem requires a low-overhead mechanism that allows
approximate computing techniques to be tuned and customized dynamically and for
each specific problem input.
1.1.3 Code Reuse Attacks
Traditionally, operating systems have been designed to manage hardware and
software resources in computing systems with the implicit assumption that the system
does not have visibility into, nor control over, the code within executing processes.
From the perspective of the OS, processes are black boxes for which to provide services
such as thread management, scheduling, interrupt handling, memory management,
file systems, device drivers, I/O, networking and security, among others.
Despite the efforts of system and software developers to build secure systems
within this design paradigm, a class of execution hijack attacks called code reuse
attacks – including a sophisticated form of code reuse known as return-oriented pro-
gramming (ROP) – remain a viable method of orchestrating attacks that subvert the
intent of running programs [34, 70, 157, 162]. It was recently reported that ROP has
been used to facilitate more than 95% of the known Windows exploits over the last
two years [136] and has been used as a key component in recent high-profile attacks
on industrial targets [60].
The difficulty in preventing such attacks lies in their very nature – programs
have a rich set of functionality in their executable code to efficiently perform useful
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computation, effectively handing attackers a rich set of code widgets that can be
subverted to achieve the attacker’s ends. Without visibility into application code
itself, and without a capability of modifying application code at runtime, modern
operating systems are limited in their ability to defend against these attacks.
Current defenses against code reuse attacks fall into one of two categories: those
that employ static Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), randomizing the
locations of program components as execution begins [21,77,171,174,182], and those
that enforce control-flow integrity (CFI) to stop unintended control flow changes and
mitigate specific classes of code reuse attacks [39, 49, 50, 52, 160, 183]. Both of these
categories of defenses have fundamental limitations.
• Limitations of ASLR — rudimentary types of code reuse attacks based on
static program analysis are thwarted, or at least made mode difficult by, static
ASLR. However, recent work has demonstrated that code reuse attacks can be
fully orchestrated and executed dynamically, thus bypassing even the strongest
forms of ASLR [156,162].
• Limitations of CFI — recent literature [42,52,131] has shown that enforcing
control-flow properties [4] (e.g., call-return parity) can defend against certain
classes of code reuse attacks when the method of attack is known in advance.
For instance, ROPDefender [52] maintains a shadow stack to ensure congruence
between return targets and call sites to defend against return-based ROP at-
tacks. However, ROP is general enough to be done without returns [37], and
thus this defense is easily bypassed by sophisticated attackers.
The key motivation behind this work is that there is a third category of approaches
that has not been well studied and requires rethinking the design of the modern
OS. This approach is to design an OS that continuously has visibility into, and the
capability to transform, application code as it runs — a code transforming operating
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system. A system design that includes this visibility and transformation power over
application code allows the system to dynamically and continuously re-randomize
native code as applications execute, breaking some of the fundamental assumptions
necessary to orchestrate a broad set of code reuse attacks.
Re-randomizing code is powerful because code reuse attacks are fundamentally
bottlenecked by the ability of the attacker to gain visibility1 into the executable
bytes of the running program, and thus the time delay between the inception, con-
struction, and execution of the attack is exploited to thwart such attacks. Code
re-randomization constricts the window of time in which a program’s bytes remain
in one place, thus preventing an attacker that can gain visibility into the executable
code of the program from making use of that code in an attack.
Prior work has acknowledged the benefits of code re-randomization [162, 174].
However, as valuable as it is to apply re-randomization, it is just as challenging to
build a system to re-randomize code with low runtime overhead. This state of affairs
was summarized in a recent paper describing a state-of-the art ROP attack:
“While [re-randomizing code pages] may be one way [to render our attack in-
effective], we expect that re-randomization costs would make such a solution
impractical.” [162]
1.2 Goals of Online Code Transformation
While the advantages of a low-overhead mechanism for online code transformation
are clear, designing such a mechanism that is deployable in production environments
has proved challenging. Despite a substantial body of prior work and having been
shown to be useful in many problem domains [16, 17, 29, 40, 41, 59, 91, 92, 98, 107,
1Visibility means that the attacker has knowledge of the contents of some part of the memory.
Such visibility can be gained, for example, via unintended memory disclosure bugs [162] or side
channels [156].
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109, 143, 152, 164, 169, 170, 173, 184, 190], dynamic compilation has not been widely
adopted, particularly in production and commercial domains. Several challenges have
prevented the realization of a deployable dynamic compilation mechanism:
• Overhead — It has been reported that companies such as Google tolerate no
more than 1% to 2% degradation in performance to support dynamic monitor-
ing approaches in production [137]. The high overhead that is common in tradi-
tional dynamic compilation frameworks has served as a barrier to adoption in these
performance-critical environments.
• Generality and Low Complexity — To avoid hardware lockin and overly com-
plex software maintenance, a deployable dynamic compilation system should im-
pose little or no burden on application developers and should require no specialized
hardware support.
• Transformation Power — Traditional dynamic optimizers raise native machine
code to an intermediate representation before applying transformations. This ap-
proach limits the power of the transformations due to loss of source level informa-
tion. Having the ability to apply transformations online that are as powerful as
static compilation significantly impacts the flexibility of the dynamic compiler.
• Continuous Extropsection — In a highly dynamic environment where multiple
applications co-run, specializing code to runtime conditions should be done both
introspectively, based on a host program’s behavior, and extrospectively, based on
external applications that are co-located on the same machine. To accomplish this,
a runtime code transformation system must be aware of changing conditions for
both itself and its neighbors, applying or undoing transformations accordingly.
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1.3 Design Overview
1.3.1 Protean Code
This dissertation describes the design of protean code, a general-purpose, near-free
approach to monitoring, regenerating and replacing the code of running applications
with semantically equivalent, specialized code versions that reflect the demands of
the execution environment. Protean code is a co-designed compiler and runtime
system built on top of LLVM [100]. At compile time, the program is prepared by a
compiler pass that virtualizes a selected subset of the edges in its control flow and call
graphs, providing hooks through which the runtime system may redirect execution.
This novel mechanism allows the runtime system, including the dynamic compiler,
to operate asynchronously while the application continuously runs. The compiler
also embeds a copy of the program’s intermediate representation (IR) into the data
region, to be utilized by the runtime compiler for rapidly performing rich analysis
and transformations on the program. The protean code runtime monitors all running
programs on the system, generating and dispatching specialized program variants that
are tailored to the particular conditions detected on the system at any given point in
time. Protean code addresses the goals described in 1.2 in the following ways:
1. Low Overhead — Diverting program control flow through selectively vir-
tualized points introduces near-zero (<1%) overhead and provides a seamless
mechanism through which the runtime compiler introduces new code variants
as they become ready.
2. General and Flexible — To enact optimizations, protean code requires no
support from the programmer or any specialized hardware. The design of pro-
tean code optimizations is in the purview of compiler writers, and protean code
can be deployed for large applications on commodity hardware.
12
3. Transformation Power — Protean code embeds the IR into the program at
compile time, which in turn is used by the runtime compiler as the starting
point for analysis and optimization. Using the IR gives the runtime compiler
the flexibility of a static compiler in terms of the analysis and optimization
options that are available.
4. Continuous Extrospection — The protean code runtime uses program counter
samples along with inter- and intra-core hardware performance monitors to
detect changes to both host and external applications co-located on a single
machine. This approach allows the runtime to react to highly dynamic envi-
ronments by revisiting compilation choices introspectively as program phases
change or extrospectively as the environment changes.
1.3.2 Increasing Server Utilization in Datacenters
With the protean code mechanism in place, we design Protean Code for Cache
Contention in Datacenters (PC3D), an approach that generates and deploys code
transformations to change how applications consume shared cache resources. To tune
cache occupancy based on dynamically changing system conditions, PC3D monitors
changes in the behavior of the host program and its external co-running applications
via a lightweight co-phase2 analysis scheme. PC3D reacts to co-phase changes by us-
ing the online code transformation capability to generate, dispatch and evaluate code
variants to discover how to mix cache pressure reduction transformations with nap-
ping in order to both meet the QoS of high-priority applications while maximizing the
performance of low-priority applications. The search through the set of transforma-
tions is accomplished via a carefully designed greedy search algorithm that searches
available code transformations to increase and decrease cache occupancy while en-
2A co-phase is defined as the combination of the currently running phases among a program and
its co-runners.
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forcing QoS targets.
1.3.3 Input Responsiveness in Approximate Computing
This work introduces Input Responsive Approximation (IRA), an approximation
approach that leverages these insights to dynamically and automatically configure
the approximation options for each problem input, including selecting which code
regions to approximate and how to tune the approximations within those regions.
IRA achieves this by creating a canary input — a much smaller representation of the
full input — at the outset of the problem. The canary input is used to dynamically
predict the accuracy and speedup characteristics of the full input for a number of
approximation options, then to dynamically choose the fastest option that achieves
the desired level of accuracy.
1.3.4 Resisting Code Reuse Attacks
On top of the protean code mechanism, we design ProtOS, an operating system
architecture that overcomes the challenge of re-randomizing application with low-
overhead to give the system a secure, efficient, transparent and robust mechanism for
transforming running native applications. We build the dynamic compiler into the
OS itself, which functions as a transparent service that operates on running programs.
This design confers the security advantages of an OS service, in that critical structures
in the dynamic compiler are as safe as other operating system services. Using the
ProtOS system architecture, we carefully design a novel service for continuous code
re-randomization that constantly re-positions and reorganizes the code of running
programs throughout execution. While a conventional system architecture leaves code
locations fixed throughout execution, the code re-randomization service in ProtOS
continuously iterates over the code in the program to generate re-randomized variants
of program code. Having an online code transformation capability allows ProtOS to
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choose (and re-choose) from a range of code transformation techniques and select
how to manage the security vs. overhead tradeoffs offered by each. Our prototype
implementation supports mixes of two re-randomization strategies – medium-grain
re-randomization that relocates functions without changing their structure, and fine-
grain re-randomization that additionally randomizes the order of basic blocks within
functions.
1.4 Summary of Contributions
This dissertation introduces a novel low-overhead online code transformation tech-
nique and leverages the online code transformation technique to design best-in-class
solutions to two important problems in modern computer systems. A summary of
the specific contributions are as follows:
• Low-overhead Online Code Transformations — We describe protean code,
a fully functional co-designed compiler and runtime system for enacting general
purpose online code transformations. We evaluate protean code on a real system
for the SPEC [80] benchmarks, showing that is has an average overhead of less
than 1% when the dynamic compiler runs on a separate core from the application
(Chapter III).
• Datacenter Server Utilization — We describe Protean Code for Cache Con-
tention in Datacenters (PC3D), a dynamic approach to mitigating cache pressure
in software via online compiler transformations. This approach includes a run-
time search algorithm that allows for the rapid discovery of an effective set of code
transformations for cache pressure reduction, as well as how elements of the search
generalize to other classes of online compiler transformations. We evaluate PC3D
on a real system for a set of CloudSuite [66] webservice workloads, SPEC [80] and
PARSEC [23] benchmarks, and SmashBench [115] microbenchmarks. We also per-
form an analysis of how deploying PC3D can impact energy and server provisioning
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requirements within full-scale datacenters. Our results show that PC3D improves
datacenter utilization by up to 2.9x and an average of 1.5x over the state-of-the-art
software contention mitigation technique across a range of workloads, while meeting
98% QoS targets for high-priority latency-sensitive applications (Chapter IV).
• Input Sensitivity in Approximate Computing – we perform a thorough
study to demonstrate the extent to which approximation accuracy can depend on
problem input, showing also that approaches used in prior work to conservatively
target worst-case behavior sacrifice the full performance potential of approximation
(Chapter V).
• Input Responsive Approximation – we introduce Input Responsive Approxi-
mation (IRA), a framework for automatically configuring approximation for every
input supplied to a problem. IRA determines where to approximate, automati-
cally selecting which code regions are most amenable to approximation for each
input, as well as configuring the approximation within those regions to the fastest
configuration that meets a specified accuracy bound (Chapter V).
• Code Transforming Operating System — We investigate the advantages of
a system architecture that changes the abstraction between operating systems and
compiler technologies by including a code transformation capability in the oper-
ating system. Based on this investigation we introduce ProtOS, the first system
architecture to host a service that provides a full-featured code transformation
capability (Chapter VI).
• Resisting Code Reuse Attacks — We describe the design and implementa-
tion of a novel service built using the ProtOS system architecture that implements
continuous code re-randomization, a transparent, low-overhead technique for un-
dermining code reuse attacks. We perform a thorough investigation of the resource
overhead and security features of our system on a spectrum of applications, in-
cluding CPU and memory intensive applications that stress the performance as-
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pects of our design. Our investigation demonstrates that program code can be
re-randomized at a frequency of 300ms while imposing an average of 9% overhead
across a wide range of applications, providing protection against state-of-the-art
code reuse attacks that have been shown in recent literature with low enough over-
head to be deployed in production systems (Chapter VI).
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CHAPTER II
Background and Related Work
In this Chapter, we give background and survey the related literature to the
topics covered in this dissertation. These include prior efforts in building online code
transformation mechanisms, as well as techniques that have been used to enable co-
location to improve datacenter server utilization and protect programs from code
reuse attacks.
2.1 Online Code Transformations
The study of online code transformations is an important problem in the com-
piler research and development communities because this class of techniques has been
shown to be useful in a number of problem domains [16, 17, 29, 40, 41, 59, 91, 92, 98,
107, 109, 143, 152, 164, 169, 170, 173, 184, 190]. However, there are several limitations
that prevent the wide adoption of online code transformation techniques in produc-
tion environments. These limitations include high runtime overhead, dependence on
programmer support or specialized hardware, limitations on the available transfor-
mations, or inability to react to dynamic execution environments.
Many online code transformation techniques are based on full virtualization, where
program execution is tightly controlled by the dynamic compilation infrastructure. In
this model, the dynamic compiler acts as a shepherd to the program, taking control of
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its execution frequently (usually at branches or other selectively-chosen control-flow
operations) to dynamically compile its upcoming execution paths [16, 30, 40]. The
main limitation of this class of techniques is that they impose high overhead. Due
to the frequency of the dynamic compiler’s intervention in the program’s execution,
the program spends a significant amount of time waiting for the dynamic compiler to
produce and optimize code, and thus they have significant runtime overheads. Despite
the effort put into minimizing this performance impact [16, 110], the state-of-the-art
system from among this class of techniques still carries overheads of 10-30% [30],
depending on the characteristics of target programs.
Others have proposed dynamic compilation techniques that uses hardware as-
sistance to minimize overhead [109]. While these have produced interesting opti-
mizations, they cannot generalize to most of the commodity hardware in use today.
Others have proposed dynamic compilation techniques that apply rules or heuris-
tics written by the programmer to determine how to generate code and undertake
optimizations [12, 47, 61, 73, 111, 173], however these techniques require significant
programmer support on a program-by-program basis.
A characteristic of most approaches to dynamic compilation systems is that they
are designed to operate on a program’s machine code, hoisting the machine code into
an intermediate representation before applying transformations and optimizations.
This approach leads to a loss of information needed to perform the full range of
program transformations available to a static compiler as it operates on the program,
such as variable types and other semantic information, limiting the flexibility of the
dynamic compiler [44].
This dissertation describes an approach that overcomes these limitations by (1)
keeping the program’s intermediate representation along with the machine code used
to implement the program, giving it the analysis and transformation capabilities of
a static compiler, and (2) decoupling the execution of the dynamic compiler and the
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program to allow the program to continuously execute at near-native speeds. This
approach is described in detail in Chapter III.
2.2 Managing Shared Resources for Co-location
Prior work has pointed out that one of the keys to achieving high utilization in
datacenter servers is to enable co-location, a technique by which multiple applications
simultaneously run alongside one another on the same server to increase the utilization
of that server [115, 190]. However, the challenge in running applications together on
the same server is that they may contend for shared server resources such as disk,
network, memory and caches, resulting in unsatisfactory performance in one or both
of the applications. The primary challenge for enabling co-locations in the datacenter
is guaranteeing the Quality of Service (QoS) of user-facing, often latency-sensitive,
applications while they are co-running with other applications.
2.2.1 Predicting Safe Co-locations
In response to this challenge, there have been several approaches proposed in
the literature [54, 114, 179, 187] to predict when co-locations are safe - that is, to
predict which co-locations will eliminate or minimize application quality of service
(QoS) violations and act on those predictions when scheduling jobs to machines.
Unfortunately, these predictably safe co-locations may not always be available and it
is difficult to encapsulate dynamic conditions into such predictions.
2.2.2 Dynamically Enabling Co-locations
To address this limitation, techniques have been proposed to make co-locations
safe by dynamically throttling down the execution of low-priority applications by
continuously introducing ‘naps’ of varying lengths and granularities into application
execution [170, 180]. This approach has the effect of alleviating the pressure an ap-
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plication places on shared server resources, which allows high-priority applications
to consume a larger share of resources to meet their QoS targets. However, as we
show in this work, applying naps is an overly blunt instrument and results in lower
throughput than necessary to enforce QoS.
Another technique, cache partitioning, has been used to explicitly control cache
resource allocations, mitigating cache interference among co-running applications to
ensure co-location safety. Hardware-based partitioning [48,94,135,151] allows for fine-
grain control on the assignment of partitions, however it requires customized hardware
and therefore has not been deployed in production systems. Software-based cache
partitioning has been enacted with page coloring [107, 163, 168, 185], which controls
the parts of cache an application can access via its page assignment in the operating
system. Unfortunately, dynamically changing an application’s cache allocation incurs
significant performance penalties due to the overhead of page migration [185]. In
addition, page coloring cannot be used in the presence of large pages [107,168].
2.2.3 ISA Support For Temporal Locality Hints
The importance of quantifying and managing cache contention has been shown
by prior work [17, 91, 98, 107, 143, 152, 164, 169, 170, 190]. Temporal locality hints for
memory accesses can be exploited to alleviate the pressure an application puts on
the shared memory subsystem. Support for these hints is available across a broad
range of instruction set architectures [67], including the modern high-performance
platforms that appear in datacenter servers such as x86 [3] and ARMv8 [2].
Temporal locality hints can be employed in software to suggest how data should
be cached. On the x86 instruction set architecture (ISA) family, the prefetchnta
instruction hints to the microarchitecture that data should be prefetched in a way that
minimizes cache pollution. The motivating premise behind supporting these hints is
that there are cases where software can identify and take advantage of the fact that
21
a memory access lacks temporal locality – that is, it is likely to be evicted from
cache before being used again. By hinting to the microarchitecture that a memory
access lacks temporal locality, it may avoid evicting other, more useful data from the
cache. In this dissertation, we leverage online code transformations to strategically
insert temporal locality hints to dynamically change the cache pressure an application
places on its co-runners.
2.3 Approximate Computing
There are many approaches for trading result accuracy for decreased execution time or
energy, based on some combination of programmers [31], runtime systems [15,83,165],
programming languages [8,148], middleware [5,69], compilers [147], and hardware [6,
62,62,75,108,126,149,181].
2.3.1 Approximation in Software
Some approaches to software-based approximation use formal analysis to pro-
vide worst-case guarantees [32, 33, 123, 153], while others use calibration offline [8,
84, 122, 124] or at runtime [5, 146, 147] to guide approximation. Others have pro-
posed software [76,142] and hardware [96] systems to catch highly inaccurate approx-
imations early in their execution. SAGE [147] uses a dynamic calibration interval
coupled with steepest ascent decisions based on the result accuracy. Another body
of related research analyzes the accuracy or robustness of programs in the event
of faults [104, 106, 161] or uncertain input data [28, 150], which has been used to
locate code regions to approximate or bound the accuracy of approximate computa-
tion [32,33,36,124].
Approximation has been performed by decreasing the number of iterations or
tasks executed [84, 116, 159] or by replacing exact operations with less accurate ver-
sions [122,153]. One such replacement strategy is to relax synchronization in parallel
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architectures [138, 147, 172]. Misailovic et al. [122] replace loops with parallel loops.
ApproxHadoop [69] is an influential recent work that leverages statistical techniques
to provide accuracy guarantees when applying approximation to MapReduce applica-
tions. Branch and data herding [153] eliminate warp divergence in GPGPUs, selecting
the most common branch or memory access for the entire warp. Compilers and frame-
works have been used to facilitate selecting between multiple programmer-supplied
implementations [8, 55, 165, 189]. Loop perforation was used by Hoffmann et al. [84]
and can incorporate extrapolation to correct bias in the result [140], similar to the
work on task skipping by Rinard [139]. Discarding tasks is a similar method to loop
perforation, but items in a queue are discarded rather than iterations in a loop [141].
2.3.2 Approximation in Hardware
In hardware, Yeh et al. [181] design an FPU with dynamic precision that uses
resource sharing, trivialization, and memoization. Approximation was applied to non-
volatile memory by Sampson et al. [149] and to volatile memory by Liu et al. [108].
EnerJ [148] is a language extension with a type system for approximate variables.
Operations on these variables are carried out on the approximate logic and storage
of specialized hardware. The language was applied to Truffle [62], a generalized
architecture designed to support approximation at the instruction level. Running code
to neural processing units (NPUs) was explored by Esmaeilzadeh et al. [63] and more
recently by others [75, 126]. NPUs have also been designed using limited-precision
analog components [6]. Online quality management using specialized hardware has
been proposed by Khudia et al. [96].
Each of these solutions requires custom hardware to achieve improvement. IRA,
on the other hand, is software-based and fully realizable on commodity hardware.
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2.4 Code Reuse Attacks and Defenses
Early program subversion attacks were based on injecting malicious code into
program memory then executing the injected code, resulting in widespread adoption
of the W ⊕ X paradigm1 in modern systems. W ⊕ X dictates that memory can either
be writable or executable, but never both, and thus is also called Data Execution
Prevention (DEP). So important is the W ⊕ X mechanism that many modern CPU
implementations have begun support W ⊕ X via per-page execute disable permission
bits [7,10,90]. The ubiquity of this paradigm has proven prohibitive to code injection
attacks, spurring a shift in the focus of attackers to reusing executable code that
already exists in the address space of the program. These code reuse attacks are
challenging to defend against. After all, programs must be able to execute code to
perform useful tasks. However, this useful code can be subversively reused by an
attacker to achieve their own ends, and in principle the code that proves to be useful
to attackers are limited only by their creativity.
A code reuse attack is enacted by first revealing the contents of execute-enabled
memory to discover where a useful code sequence resides, followed by some method of
redirecting execution to that location. This is often achieved by writing the address of
that code sequence onto the stack to cause the program to return to it. Combined with
the wide variety of powerful system interaction capabilities available in libc (e.g.,
changing memory protections or modifying file state) and the fact that nearly every
Unix program links against it, these attacks came to be known as return-to-libc
attacks. However, this classical model of return-to-libc attacks is somewhat lim-
ited, as it depends on the just the right sequence of instructions being present in the
program.
1We use the nomenclature R, W and X to refer to memory read, write and execute permissions,
respectively.
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2.4.1 Return-oriented Programming
Shacham [157] extended the return-to-libc attack, demonstrating the feasibility of
chaining together short sequences of bytes ending in return instructions – gadgets –
from disparate locations in memory to execute arbitrary functionality on behalf of the
attacker. Because control is passed from gadget to gadget using return instructions,
this technique was dubbed a return-oriented programming (ROP) attack. The basic
sequence of steps in executing a ROP attack is as follows:
1. Locate Gadgets — the attacker first gains visibility into the contents of ex-
ecutable program memory to discover where useful gadgets reside. This can
be done via static analysis, side channels, or other information leaks such as
memory disclosure bugs. Memory disclosure bugs that reveal the contents of
memory are commonplace in production applications, such as in the OpenSSL
Heartbleed vulnerability that affected as many as 55% of popular HTTPS web-
sites [58]. Gadgets need not be sequential or even near one another, as control
can be passed from gadget to gadget via the return instructions at the end of
each gadget.
2. Construct and Deliver Payload — gadgets are chained together as primitive
building blocks that produce some higher-order functionality that is of use to
the attacker (e.g., setting up arguments and making a system call). Once the
gadget chain is constructed, a payload containing the gadget addresses is placed
onto the stack.
3. Hijack Execution — the execution of the gadget sequence can be triggered
by hijacking the flow of execution (e.g., by overwriting a function pointer) to
the first gadget. Once the first gadget is executed, control returns to the second
gadget, which executes then returns to the third gadget, and so forth, until the
functionality desired by the attacker has been executed in full.
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ROP is the state-of-the-art technique in subverting program execution, and has
produced a wide body of academic literature dealing with ever more sophisticated
attack and defense techniques in recent years [25,27,34,37,42,51,52,68,70,82,89,131,
154,156,157,166,167,174,178,182,183]. Moreover, it was recently reported that ROP
was used in 95%+ of the known Windows exploits over the last two years [136] and
in attacks on a number of sensitive industrial firms [60].
ROP was originally conceived by Shacham [157], where he argues that any program
linking against libc likely contains a rich enough set of ROP gadgets to achieve
arbitrary functionality. Others have extended ROP and developed automated tools
for identifying and constructing useful gadgets chains for ROP exploits [25, 56, 89,
154]. Checkoway et al. [38] demonstrate an attack on a widely used voting machine.
Checkoway et al. [37] and Bletsch et al. [27] generalize ROP to circumvent stack-based
defense mechanisms by constructing gadgets without the use of return instructions.
Recently, in response to the popularization of various forms of Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR), Snow et al. [162] demonstrate an exploit technique based on
memory disclosures to map a program’s randomized address space at runtime. Seibert
et al. [156] present side-channel methods that an attacker can use to learn about
code locations. Others have shown ROP attacks to exploit vulnerabilities in popular
applications, including Adobe Flash, Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer [132,167].
2.4.2 ASLR and Its Limitations
One of the key components of a modern code reuse attack is in obtaining visibility
into the executable bytes in program memory. With access to the program binary file,
gaining this visibility into the program’s code is trivial because the binary file con-
tains a layout and description of where in memory those bytes will eventually reside.
Similarly, code from dynamically-linked libraries loaded at fixed or predictable loca-
tions in memory are easily predicted and usable by attackers. This has resulted in the
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widespread adoption of coarse-grain Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), a
countermeasure that randomizes the base address of segments such as executable and
library code, stack, and heap at each program invocation so that their exact positions
are not known in advance [21,77,82,88,97,130,174,182].
However, randomizing segment positions has been shown to be a weak defense
because the locations of large swathes of bytes become visible when the location of
anything in the segment is leaked. For example, a leaked function address effectively
gives away all of the function’s bytes because the function’s structure is known in
advance. Further extensions to ASLR randomize the locations of functions in the
segment, known as medium-grain ASLR. Still others, dubbed fine-grain ASLR, ran-
domize the locations of basic blocks within functions [174], the locations of instruc-
tions in blocks [82], or the contents of instructions themselves [130]. These techniques
raise the bar and make attacks more difficult, however recent work has shown that
even with the strongest forms of ASLR that statically change the content [130] and
locations [82] of instructions, repeatedly exploitable vulnerabilities can be used by
attackers to construct a map of memory on-the-fly, eventually allowing the attacker
to find a sufficient number of gadgets to construct a ROP attack [156,162].
2.4.3 Other Defense Mechanisms
Code reuse, and ROP in particular, are commonly used in real-world exploits [60,
136], and are an active area of literature. In response to the proliferation of these
attacks, several other classes of defenses have emerged.
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI). CFI, first introduced in 2005 [4], thwarts at-
tacks by preventing deviations from a program’s intended control flow. CFI imple-
mentations in compilers and binary instrumentation strengthen control flow stati-
cally [105,129] or dynamically [39,52,129,175]. Others use sophisticated software and
hardware mechanisms to strengthen protection and reduce overhead for CFI [26, 42,
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131,178,182,183]. Recently, Arther et al. proposed removing indirect branches from
the ISA to enforce CFI [11]. However, CFI enforcement mechanisms are difficult to
generalize beyond limited classes of attacks, are difficult to integrate into production
systems [125,182] or introduce significant runtime overhead [39,52]. Moreover, recent
attacks have compromised state-of-the-art CFI mechanisms [34,70].
kBouncer [131] and ROPecker [42] are two recently proposed, highly effective
runtime defense mechanisms against ROP. These works leverage hardware registers
to capture anomalous behaviors that often lead to the invocation of sensitive system
calls. However, the defense capabilities of these approaches can suffer from insufficient
storage for monitoring long history and it rely heavily on the assumption that ROP
gadgets behave in certain patterns.
Continuous Re-randomization. Others have recognized value of runtime re-
randomization in thwarting code reuse attacks, while also recognizing that it is chal-
lenging to design re-randomization with low overhead [162, 174]. Guiffrida et al.
re-randomize microkernel code and data to protect against kernel exploits [68], re-
randomizing every 1 second with 40-50% overhead. Re-randomization in ProtOS
focuses on efficiently re-randomizing native application code. Such techniques for
protecting the OS are valuable and complementary to our work, protecting kernel
structures while we protect userspace applications.
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CHAPTER III
Protean Code: Low-overhead Online Code
Transformations
This chapter introduces protean code, a novel approach for enacting arbitrary com-
piler transformations at runtime for native programs running on commodity hardware
with negligible (<1%) overhead. The fundamental insight behind the underlying
mechanism of protean code is that, instead of maintaining full control throughout the
program’s execution as with traditional dynamic compilers, protean code allows the
original binary to execute continuously while the dynamic compilation mechanism
works asynchronously and in parallel to the running application. In this approach,
the dynamic compiler diverts control flow of the application only at a set of virtualized
points, allowing rapid and seamless rerouting to the newly transformed code variants
produced by the dynamic compiler. In addition, the protean code compiler embeds
the compiler’s intermediate representation (IR) with high-level semantic information
into the program, empowering the dynamic compiler to perform rich analysis and
transformations online with little overhead.
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3.1 Protean Code
Protean code is a novel online code transformation system designed to address
the challenges that prevent the wide adoption of traditional dynamic compilation
techniques in production environments; it is low-overhead, requires no customized
hardware, has the transformative capabilities of a full-fledged compiler, and can make
compilation decisions based on the behavior of all running applications. Protean
code consists of a co-designed compiler and runtime system, termed the protean code
compiler (pcc) and the protean code runtime.
Presented in Figure 3.1, pcc readies the host program for runtime compilation by
making two classes of changes to the program. First, it virtualizes a subset of the
edges in the program’s control flow and call graphs. These virtualized edges then serve
as points in the program’s control flow at which the runtime system may redirect exe-
cution. Second, the compiler embeds several metadata structures, including an Edge
Virtualization Table (EVT) and intermediate representation of the program, within
the program’s data region, which are used to aid the runtime system in dynamically
introducing new code variants into the running program.
Shown in Figure 3.2, the protean code runtime is responsible for monitoring a host
program and its external execution environment in order to dynamically generate
and dispatch code variants when needed. The runtime system first initializes by
attaching to the program, discovering the program metadata and setting up a shared
code cache from which the program can execute new code variants. To generate and
dispatch a code variant, the runtime compiler, an LLVM-based compiler backend,
leverages the IR. The new code variant is then inserted into the code cache and
dispatched into the running host program by the EVT manager. During host program
execution, the lightweight monitoring component of the runtime detects changes in
both the host program phases and the external environment, including co-running
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the protean code compiler
applications, using samples of program counters and hardware performance monitors.
In response to phase and environment changes, a decision engine determines when
and how to generate new code variants and selects the appropriate variant for the
current execution phase.
3.1.1 Design Principles
The primary goal of protean code is to provide a dynamic code transformation so-
lution that is deployable in production environments and is powerful enough to enable
techniques such as the PC3D runtime described in Chapter IV and the continuous
code re-randomization technique described in Chapter VI. There are three principles
used in the design of protean code to realize this goal:
1. Maintaining absolute control of the program throughout execution, as in tradi-
tional dynamic compilers such as Dynamo [16] and DynamoRIO [30], leads to
high overhead. Protean code instead allows the original binary to continuously
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Figure 3.2: Overview of the protean code runtime
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execute and diverts the program control flow at a set of virtualized points, in-
troducing negligible overhead. The runtime compiler is invoked asynchronously
at controllable granularity, which also limits the overhead.
2. Many traditional dynamic compilers hoist the native machine code into an inter-
mediate format at runtime to perform analysis and transformation [16, 59,109,
112,155], leading to overhead and the loss of rich semantic information present
in IR from the static compiler [44]. Protean code embeds the IR into the pro-
gram binaries, allowing the dynamic compiler to perform powerful analysis and
transformations online with little overhead.
3. Protean code requires no support from the programmer or any specialized hard-
ware, allowing it to be seamlessly deployed for large applications on commodity
hardware. It leverages hardware performance monitors for lightweight monitor-
ing, phase analysis and transformation selection, further minimizing overhead.
A useful property of the application binaries produced by pcc is that they can
be run without the runtime system, incurring negligible extra runtime over-
head. In addition, once compiled with pcc, any protean code runtime can
be used. These are particularly useful features in modern production environ-
ments, where rapidly changing conditions may dictate applying different classes
of optimizations in the pursuit of different objectives to the same application
binary.
3.1.2 Protean Code Compiler
The Protean Code Compiler (pcc) readies the host program for runtime com-
pilation by (1) virtualizing control flow edges and (2) embedding meta-data in the
program binary.
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3.1.2.1 Control Flow Edge Virtualization
pcc adds a compiler pass to convert a subset of the branches and calls in the
program from direct to indirect operations. By virtualizing a subset of edges, pcc
sets up those edges as points in the programs execution where its control flow path
may be easily altered by the protean code runtime to route program execution to an
alternate variant of the code.
There are some important considerations to be made when selecting which edges
to virtualize. Selecting too many edges or edges that are executed too frequently may
result in unwanted overheads because indirect branches are generally slightly slower
than direct branches (the causes of this overhead are discussed shortly). On the
other hand, selecting only edges that are rarely executed risks introducing large gaps
in execution during which new code variants are not executed. Our current approach
to selecting edges is to virtualize only function calls, and only those where the callee
function has more than one basic block. We find that this approach works well in
practice, resulting in negligible overhead while ensuring that execution is promptly
routed to the new code variants.
Edge Virtualization Overheads. Protean code contains virtualized control flow
edges to allow the runtime to redirect execution as those edges are executed. There
are three sources of possible overhead that arise from edge virtualization. First, it
may lead to increased cache/memory activity. Because the EVT may be updated at
any point by the runtime, it is treated as volatile and its entries must be loaded from
memory at each use. Third, the edge virtualization table resides in memory, which
may impact program load time and memory memory footprint. Third, on certain
platforms indirect branch and call instructions use more space than direct branches
and calls. For example, direct and indirect calls with a 32-bit operand on x86 64
are 5 and 6 bytes long respectively. This may put slightly higher pressure on I-cache
and decode resources in the CPU. We evaluate the overhead of edge virtualization
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in Section 3.2, where we observe that the overhead of edge virtualization is small in
practice (< 1% on average).
3.1.2.2 Program Metadata
Two types of program metadata are used by the protean code runtime to rapidly
generate and dispatch correct, alternate code variants at runtime.
Edge Virtualization Table (EVT). A structure called the EVT contains the
source and target addresses of the edges virtualized by pcc. The EVT is the central
mechanism by which execution of the program is redirected by the runtime. To change
execution, the runtime simply rewrites target addresses in the EVT to point to the
new code variant.
Intermediate Representation (IR). pcc serializes, compresses and places the
compiler’s intermediate representation (IR) of the program into its data region, which
the runtime decompresses then deserializes, leveraging it to perform analysis and
transformations. Having direct access to the IR yields two significant advantages.
First, it allows the runtime to avoid disassembling the binary, which can be diffi-
cult or impossible without access to fine-grain information about the executing code
paths [102, 127]. Second, the alternative of hoisting the binary to IR, as is done
in prior work, loses important semantic information and limits the flexibility of the
compiler [44]. As an example of the utility of the IR, in this work PC3D gleans
loop structure and nesting depth from the IR and uses that information to guide
compilation decisions.
3.1.3 Protean Code Runtime
The protean code runtime is a set of mechanisms that work together to generate
and dispatch code variants as the host program executes.
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3.1.3.1 Runtime Initialization
Operating on an executable prepared by pcc, the runtime process begins by at-
taching to the program. It first discovers the locations of the structures inserted by
pcc at compile-time, including the EVT and the IR. It then initializes a code cache,
used to store the code variants generated by the dynamic compiler. Finally, because
the EVT and code cache are structures that are shared between the program and the
runtime and may be frequently accessed, the runtime sets up a shared memory region
via an anonymous mmap to encompass both structures.
3.1.3.2 Code Generation and Dispatch
The runtime generates and dispatches code variants into the program asynchronously.
When a new variant of a code region is requested, the dynamic compiler leverages
the IR of the code region to generate the new variant. Once a new code variant has
been generated, it is placed into the code cache. The EVT manager then modifies the
EVT so that the target of the corresponding virtualized edge is the head of the newly
minted variant in the code cache. The EVT update is a single atomic memory write
operation on most modern platforms, and thus requires no synchronization between
the host program and the runtime to work correctly.
Throughout these actions of the runtime process, execution of the program pro-
ceeds as normal until control flows through the virtualized edge, at which point control
reaches the new code variant.
3.1.3.3 Monitoring, Phase Analysis and Decisions
The runtime supports both introspection, monitoring changes in the host program,
and extrospection, monitoring changes in the execution environment. Based on this
monitoring, the runtime makes decisions and adapts to changing system conditions
such as application input/load fluctuation, starting or stopping of co-running appli-
36
cations, and phase changes among both the host programs and external programs.
Introspection. For host programs, the runtime identifies hot code regions by
sampling the program counter periodically through the ptrace interface. The runtime
then associates the program counter samples with high-level code structures such as
functions, allowing the runtime to keep track of which code regions are currently hot,
as well as how hot regions change over time.
To identify phase changes, the runtime also leverages hardware performance mon-
itors to track the progress of the program. Phases are defined in terms of the hot
code identified by program counter samples described above as well as by the progress
rate of the running applications using metrics such as instructions per cycle (IPC) or
branches retired per cycle (BPC). Since hardware performance monitors are ubiqui-
tous on modern platforms and can be sampled with negligible overhead, this approach
allows the runtime to conduct phase identification in a manner that is both lightweight
and general across hardware platforms.
Extrospection. Similarly, for other external programs, the runtime can optionally
track program progress and identifies phase changes via hardware performance mon-
itors. Microarchitectural status and performance, using metrics such as cache misses
or bandwidth usage, are also tracked through the performance monitor interface.
Additionally, the runtime can be configured to use application-level metrics reported
through application-specific reporting interfaces, such as queries per second or 99th
percentile tail query latency for a web search application.
Dynamic Transformation Decisions. The decision engine determines (1) when
to invoke the dynamic compiler, (2) what transformations to apply, and (3) which
variant to dispatch into the running program. The policies guiding the decision
engine depend on objective of the runtime system (e.g., the optimization and security
applications shown later use their own decision engines). Note that these policies can
be designed to carefully control how often compilation occurs to limit the overhead
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Figure 3.3: Dynamic compiler overhead when making no code modifications (normal-
ized to native execution)
introduced by running the dynamic compiler alongside the application.
3.2 Performance Investigation
We now perform an investigation of the runtime overhead of the protean code
mechanism. The protean code static compiler and runtime compiler are implemented
on top of LLVM version 3.3. When compiling protean code or non-protean code
benchmarks, compilation is done with -O2. All experiments are performed on a quad
core 2.6GHz AMD Phenom II X4 server. We use the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark
suite [80]; as LLVM does not natively support Fortran, our prototype implementation
does not handle Fortran and so we focus our evaluation exclusively on the C and C++
benchmarks in SPEC CPU2006.
3.2.1 Virtualization Mechanism
First we investigate the baseline cost of virtualizing execution with protean code
and compare this cost with that of virtualizing execution with DynamoRIO [30].
DynamoRIO is a state of the art binary translation-based dynamic compiler, chosen
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Figure 3.4: Dynamic compilation stress tests; compilation occurs on a separate core
from the host application
as a baseline because it is a mature software project that is actively maintained and
is well known for its low overhead relative to other dynamic compilers [65, 188].
Figure 3.3 shows the overhead for SPEC applications compiled as protean code
relative to the non-protean code version of the benchmark. The base performance
overhead of protean code mechanism is shown to be negligible, less than 1% on aver-
age. DynamoRIO, on the other hand, introduces an average of 18% overhead when
performing no code modification. The primary distinction between binary translation
and protean code is that protean code performs compilation asynchronously, out of
the application’s control flow path. Running protean code is low overhead because
the application is allowed to continually execute, even when code is being compiled
and dispatched. Binary translation incurs higher overhead because it requires all ex-
ecution to occur from the code cache or interpreter, and thus control is continually
diverted from the application back to the binary translation system.
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3.2.2 Dynamic Compilation Overhead
The protean code runtime runs in its own process and performs compilation asyn-
chronously with respect to the running host application, employing a dynamic com-
piler to introduce new code variants into the running host program. We next present
a set of dynamic compilation stress tests to demonstrate the impact of the level of
activity of the dynamic compiler. In these experiments, the host program is run with
a protean runtime configured to periodically recompile randomly selected functions
throughout the life of the running application.
Figure 3.4 shows the results of these experiments for the SPEC benchmarks for a
range of different time intervals between recompilations, where the runtime process
(including the dynamic compiler) uses a dedicated physical core. The results show
that this causes the dynamic compiler to generate very little overhead to the host
program, even when performing recompilation every 5ms. We note that the LLVM
compiler backend uses an average of around 5ms to compile a function, so the 5ms
trigger interval results in the dynamic compiler being active almost continuously.
Figure 3.5 presents, for the SPEC benchmarks, the average performance overhead of
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performing the same dynamic compilation stress tests, with the runtime on the same
core as the host or on a separate core from the host.
While executing the runtime on a separate core introduces minimal overhead no
matter how frequently code generation is performed, the overheads of performing the
compilation on the same core as the host program can be significant in extreme cases
where compilation is nearly continuous. In an era of multicore and manycore proces-
sors, and particularly in production environments, the common case is for cores to
be heavily underutilized. For example, Google reports typical server utilization levels
of 10-50% [19]. Nevertheless, in such instances where no separate core is available
for the runtime, this overhead can be controlled by limiting the frequency of recom-
pilation. As shown in Figure 3.5, the overhead of recompilation on the same core
becomes negligible at 800ms.
3.3 Summary
This chapter presents protean code, a novel approach to dynamic compilation
designed to be deployable for performance optimization in production environments.
Protean code is nearly free of performance overhead (<1% on average), operates
without any special hardware or programmer support, and has the flexibility of a
robust static compiler. This combination of features gives protean code the ability
to remain in place continuously to establish an online code transformation capability.
Upcoming chapters will show how this capability can be leveraged to build runtime
systems to improve the efficiency and security of modern systems.
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CHAPTER IV
Online Code Transformations to Improve
Utilization in Datacenters
Rampant dynamism due to load fluctuations, co-runner changes, and varying lev-
els of interference poses a threat to application quality of service (QoS) and has limited
our ability to allow co-locations in modern warehouse scale computers (WSCs). In-
struction set features such as the non-temporal memory access hints found in modern
ISAs (both ARM and x86) may be useful in mitigating these effects. However, despite
the challenge of this dynamism and the availability of an instruction set mechanism
that might help address the problem, a key capability missing in the system software
stack in modern WSCs is the ability to dynamically transform (and re-transform) the
executing application code to apply these instruction set features when necessary.
Leveraging protean code, this chapter describes Protean Code for Cache Con-
tention in Datacenters (PC3D). PC3D dynamically transforms running applications
to strategically insert non-temporal access hints, allowing low-priority batch appli-
cations to execute at high efficiency when running alongside high-priority latency-
sensitive applications. Our results show that PC3D achieves utilization improvements
of up to 2.8x (1.5x on average) higher than state-of-the-art contention mitigation run-
time techniques at a QoS target of 98%.
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4.1 Protean Code for Cache Contention in Datacenters
Protean Code for Cache Contention in Datacenters (PC3D) is a protean code
runtime that dynamically applies compiler transformations to insert non-temporal
memory access hints, tuning the pressure a host application exerts on shared caches
when the QoS of an external application is threatened. PC3D is implemented entirely
as a runtime system that operates on an application prepared by the protean code
compiler, requiring no changes to the basic protean code compiler setup described in
Section 3.1.
The goal of PC3D is to find and dispatch variants of the host program code
that contain a mix of non-temporal cache hints that allows the host’s co-runners
to meet their QoS targets while maximizing the throughput of the host. To ensure
co-runner QoS, PC3D searches through a spectrum of program variants that have
varying levels of cache contentiousness. The effectiveness of interference reduction of
each variant is empirically quantified online by the protean code runtime. The best-
performing program variant is then dispatched and runs until a new program phase
or external application sensitivity phase is detected. In cases where relying solely on
non-temporal cache hints is unable to ensure QoS of the external applications, naps
are mixed with cache pressure reduction as a fallback.
4.1.1 Code Variant Search Space
PC3D generates and dispatches program variants that contain a selection of non-
temporal cache hints. We refer to each such program variant as a bit vector M =
〈M1,M2, ...,MN〉, where N is the number of loads in the host program’s code and
Mi ∈ {0, 1} represents the absence or presence of a non-temporal cache hint associated
with the ith load. The set of program variants of this form is the set of all possible bit
vectors of length N , which has a cardinality of 2N . Figure 4.1 shows the four variants
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prefetchnta (%r14)        // m1 
mov    %r13,%rsi 
shl    $0x4,%rsi 
mov    (%r14),%r8 
prefetchnta (%r8,%rsi,1)  // m2 
mov    (%r8,%rsi,1),%rax
(a) <m1, m2> = <1, 1>
prefetchnta (%r14)        // m1 
mov    %r13,%rsi 
shl    $0x4,%rsi 
mov    (%r14),%r8 
                          // m2 
mov    (%r8,%rsi,1),%rax
(b) <m1, m2> = <1, 0>
                          // m1 
mov    %r13,%rsi 
shl    $0x4,%rsi 
mov    (%r14),%r8 
prefetchnta (%r8,%rsi,1)  // m2 
mov    (%r8,%rsi,1),%rax
(c) <m1, m2> = <0, 1>
                          // m1 
mov    %r13,%rsi 
shl    $0x4,%rsi 
mov    (%r14),%r8 
                          // m2 
mov    (%r8,%rsi,1),%rax
(d) <m1, m2> = <0, 0>
Figure 4.1: The set of variants for a small code region within libquantum on
x86 64. Non-temporal hints and affected loads are shown in bold
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Algorithm 1: Greedy search for a code variant best that uses the right mix of
cache contention reduction and napping to maximize application performance
output: best
/* enact/evaluate 0 to obtain the nap intensity (nap0) applied to the variant to
meet co-runner QoS and the performance (R0) of the variant at that nap
intensity */
(nap0, R0)← V ariantEval(0, 0, 1)
(nap1, R1)← V ariantEval(1, 0, 1)
napUB ← nap0, napLB ← nap1
m← 1, best← 1, Rbest ← R1
i← 1
while i ≤ n and napLB < napUB do
m← 〈m1, ..., !mi, ...,mn〉 // flip ith bit in m
(napmRm)← V ariantEval(m,napLB, napUB)
if Rbest < Rm then
Rbest ← Rm, best← m, napUB ← napm
else
m← 〈m1, ..., !mi, ...,mn〉 // reject change
end
i+ +
end
return best
for a small code region (N = 2) within libquantum, where each of the four variants
contains a different mix of non-temporal cache hints. PC3D searches these variants
using a greedy search algorithm whose complexity is O(N), described in detail in
Section 4.1.3. However, even with a search complexity that is linear in the number of
load instructions, the number of variants may still be large. To navigate this space
efficiently, PC3D employs several heuristics.
4.1.2 Variant Search Space Reduction
PC3D focuses on the loads most likely to have a significant impact on application
behavior. The heuristics employed to this end are as follows:
• Exclude Uncovered Code — Leveraging the PC samples collected for host pro-
gram phase analysis, we expect code regions that never appear in those samples
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Figure 4.2: Proportion of dynamic loads in contentious applications coming from
loads at maximum loop depth
to have a minimal impact on cache pressure and application performance. There-
fore, the loads from regions not appearing in the PC samples are pruned from the
search space prior to the search. This reduces the number of loads that must be
considered by an average of 12×.
• Prioritize Hotter Code — Furthermore, we expect code regions appearing more
frequently in the PC samples to have a higher impact. Therefore PC3D prioritizes
loads from hotter code regions in the search.
• Only Innermost Loops — For a range of contentious applications as shown in
Figure 4.2, we have observed that an average of more than 80% of the dynamic loads
come from the maximum-depth loop(s) within each of the program’s functions.
Leveraging the program’s IR, PC3D recognizes loops and their nesting depths,
then prunes from the search space loads that are not at the maximum depth.
The number of static loads remaining after applying these heuristics is on average
a factor of 44× smaller than the total number of static loads in the program (see
Section 4.2.1).
These heuristics focus the optimization decisions made by PC3D on the most
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important regions of code, a strategy we expect will also prove to be useful among
other protean runtimes. After PC3D applies these heuristics, its search is limited to
variants that are of the form m = 〈m1,m2, ...,mn〉, where mi ∈ {0, 1}. m is a bit
vector of the n loads from innermost loops among active code regions in the program
phase, ordered roughly by how much impact they are expected to have on execution.
For convenience, we refer to the variant where every load lacks a non-temporal hint
as m = 0 and its converse, the variant where every load has a non-temporal hint, as
m = 1.
4.1.3 Traversing the Variant Search Space
The variant search is guided by Algorithm 1. The search begins by evaluating
variants 0 and 1, which are the variants that exert the most and least amount of
cache pressure, respectively, out of all the variants in the search space. Because these
variants are at the extremes of cache pressure, they are also at the extremes of the
nap intensity required to meet co-runner QoS targets, and therefore may be viewed as
lower and upper bounds, respectively, for the nap intensity that would theoretically
be required to satisfy co-runner QoS for any program variant. As we discuss shortly,
these bounds are used to limit the range of nap intensities that are evaluated for each
variant, improving how quickly PC3D can converge on the right code variant.
Using 1 as a starting point, the algorithm steps through loads in the order of
decreasing importance. For each load, the algorithm revokes the load’s non-temporal
hint, then calls V ariantEval (Algorithm 2) to enact the resulting code variant and
evaluate whether that revocation improves the application’s performance given the
particular level of cache pressure produced by that variant along with the level of nap
intensity required to allow the application’s co-runners to meet their QoS targets.
If the incremental change is found to have improved application performance, the
change is kept and the algorithm repeats these steps on the next load. Otherwise,
47
Algorithm 2: V ariantEval, evaluation of a single program variant in PC3D
input : m, napLB, napUB
output: napm, BPSm
napcur ← (napLB + napUB)/2
BPS ← 0
generate and dispatch variant m
while napLB < napUB do
set nap intensity (napcur)
if QoS of co-runners is satisfied then
napUB ← napcur
BPS ← BranchesPerSecond m
else
napLB ← napcur
end
napcur ← (napLB + napUB)/2
end
return (napcur, BPS)
the change is rejected and the algorithm repeats these steps on the next load.
Note that each variant accepted as the best produces more cache pressure than the
previous best version. Similar to the logic that was used to establish program-wide
lower and upper bounds on the nap intensity range, upon accepting a variant as the
best the upper bound on nap intensity is lowered to the nap intensity of the newly
accepted variant.
4.1.4 Online Evaluation of Variants
PC3D searches for program variants that improve application performance while
meeting co-runner QoS. Guiding the search are empirical evaluations of a sequence of
program variants, which are dispatched then evaluated against the current running
set of co-runners. Each variant produces a particular level of cache contentiousness,
and may need to run with a particular nap intensity to allow its co-runners to hit
their QoS targets.
This concept is demonstrated in Figure 4.3, which presents the performance of
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Figure 4.3: Online empirical evaluation for two variants of libquantum (application)
running with er-naive (co-runner)
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two variants of libquantum (host application) running with er-naive (external high-
priority co-runner) as a function of the nap intensity applied to libquantum. Per-
formance of libquantum is reported as branches per second (BPS) normalized to
its BPS while running alone, while performance of er-naive is reported as instruc-
tions per second (IPS) normalized to its IPS running alone. We use BPS for host
applications since, unlike branch counts, their static instruction counts change with
the insertion/removal of non-temporal hints. As Figure 4.3 shows, each of these two
variants exerts a different level of cache pressure on er-naive, and thus given a hypo-
thetical QoS target of 95% for er-naive, a different level of nap intensity is required
to allow er-naive to hit its QoS target. In this example, the libquantum variant
in 4.3(a) requires a nap intensity of 99% to allow er-naive to meet its QoS target,
while the variant in 4.3(b) requires a nap intensity of just 23%. At those respective
nap intensities, the performance of variant (b) is far better than that of (a).
When evaluating a variant dynamically to discover the minimum nap intensity
needed to meet co-runner QoS, PC3D need not evaluate the entire spectrum of nap
intensities. The performance of both the application and its co-runners are monotonic
as a function of nap intensity, so PC3D organizes the variant evaluation as a binary
search over the range of nap intensities, shown in Algorithm 2. To reduce the search
even further, PC3D performs the binary search only within the range of nap intensities
between the lower and upper bounds established by evaluating other variants.
4.1.5 Monitoring Co-runner QoS
PC3D continuously monitors application co-runners to measure their quality of
service (QoS). In this work, we use co-runner instructions per second (IPS) relative
to the IPS running without the host application as a proxy for QoS. To measure
co-runner IPS without the host, PC3D uses a flux approach similar to the mechanism
described in [180], in which the host is put to sleep for a short period of time (40ms
50
in our work) and performance measurements are taken while the co-runners execute
without interference from the host. We deploy one such measurement every 4 seconds,
allowing the flux technique to be deployed with very little (1%) overhead.
51
4.2 Evaluation
Methodology The protean code static compiler and runtime compiler are imple-
mented on top of LLVM version 3.3. When compiling protean code or non-protean
code benchmarks, compilation is done with -O2. All experiments are performed on
a quad core 2.6GHz AMD Phenom II X4 server. Applications used throughout the
evaluation are drawn from CloudSuite [66], the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite [80],
the PARSEC benchmark suite [23] and SmashBench [115].
4.2.1 PC3D Variant Search Heuristics
PC3D searches a set of program variants to arrive at a variant that improves the
host application performance in the presence of some set of external applications.
One of the keys to making this approach effective is to locate good code variants
quickly. To accomplish this, PC3D employs several heuristics, described in detail
in Section 4.1.2, to reduce the number of load instructions considered in the search.
Figure 4.4 evaluates how effective these heuristics are across a set of contentious
applications. Each cluster shows the number of loads that must be considered by the
search as each successive heuristic is applied, normalized to the total number of loads
in the application. Where there are multiple phases in a program, Figure 4.4 presents
the average number of loads across all phases. Absolute counts of the number of loads
that appear in each program are also included as numbers at the top of the plot.
As described in Section 4.1.2, PC3D first discards loads from uncovered code –
code regions that appear to the runtime system to have never executed during the
current phase. On average, discarding loads from uncovered code results in a reduc-
tion of the search space by a factor of 12×. Second, PC3D extracts loop structure
from the IR and discards each load that is not at the maximum loop depth within
each function.
Overall, these heuristics are effective, reducing the number of static loads exam-
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Figure 4.4: Heuristics significantly reduce the search space for PC3D. Static load
counts of the full programs are presented in parentheses above the bars
ined in the search by an average factor of 44× while covering more than 80% of the
dynamic loads. It is notable that the reduction in number of loads is largest for pro-
grams with high load counts, such as soplex (15666 loads reduced to 57) and sphinx3
(4963 loads reduced to 116), showing that the heuristics help keep the variant search
manageable even for programs that have large code bases.
4.2.2 Utilization Improvements from PC3D
In this section we evaluate PC3D, showing its impact on server utilization and
application QoS when running batch applications with latency-sensitive webservice
applications, including web-search, media-streaming and graph-analytics from
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Figure 4.5: Utilization improvement of applications running with web-search
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Figure 4.6: Utilization improvement of applications running with media-streaming
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Figure 4.7: Utilization improvement of applications running with graph-analytics
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Figure 4.8: QoS of web-search running with various applications
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Figure 4.9: QoS of media-streaming running with various applications
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Figure 4.10: QoS of graph-analytics running with various applications
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Figure 4.11: Utilization (top) and QoS (bottom) of PC3D vs. ReQoS, presented as
the average across all CloudSuite, SPEC and SmashBench applications
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Table 4.1: Applications used in datacenter experiments
Host (batch) applications
External (latency-
sensitive) apps
web-search,
CloudSuite - media-streaming,
graph-analytics
SPEC
bzip2, milc, soplex, libquantum, mcf,
CPU2006
libquantum, lbm, sphinx3 milc, omnetpp,
xalancbmk
SmashBench bst, blockie, er-naive, sledge bst, er-naive
PARSEC - streamcluster
CloudSuite. The set of latency-sensitive and batch applications we evaluate are pre-
sented in Table 4.1. For these experiments, QoS is presented as the instructions
per second (IPS) an application achieves normalized to its IPS running alone on the
server. Using IPS in this fashion as a proxy for QoS is consistent with practices in
industry [186], where simple performance monitors are collected regularly and ubiq-
uitously via mechanisms such as the Google Wide Profiler (GWP) [137] and used for
making QoS estimates. Likewise, we present application utilization as the branches
per second (BPS) measured by PC3D as a fraction of the BPS the non-protean ver-
sion of the application achieves while running alone on the server. BPS is a useful
metric in this case because PC3D introduces control-invariant code transformations
that may include executing extra non-temporal access hint instructions in key code
regions.
In these experiments, the latency-sensitive application runs on a single core of the
server, while the contentious batch application runs on another single core. The con-
tentious batch application is compiled with the protean code compiler, and may be
modified dynamically to be less cache contentious if PC3D detects that the latency-
sensitive application fails to meet its QoS target. The PC3D runtime consumes only
a small fraction of the cycles on the server (Figure 4.13), monitoring all running ap-
plications to detect co-phase changes, checking that the latency-sensitive application
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meets its QoS target, and potentially introducing transformations that improve the
cache contentiousness of the batch application.
Live Webservices. Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 show the utilization gains achieved
by PC3D over a policy of disallowing co-locations on a series of benchmarks as they
run with web-search, graph-analytics, and media-streaming. Each cluster of
bars shows the results of a particular batch application running against one of the
webservices. The three bars in each cluster show the utilization gained with QoS
targets of 90%, 95% and 98%. As applications co-run with web-search, they show
an average utilization gain of 49% when a 98% QoS target is used. When less stringent
QoS targets are in place, PC3D must mitigate contention to a lesser degree, which
allows them to achieve higher utilization rates. With a 95% QoS target, the average
utilization is 67% and with a 90% QoS target the utilization gain is 81%. Similarly,
utilization improvements for graph-analytics are 67%, 75%, 82% for the three QoS
targets. media-streaming is more sensitive to contention than web-search and
graph-analytics, where we observe utilization improvements of 22%, 40% and 60%.
Overall, these results show that PC3D consistently delivers substantial utilization
gains, even in the presence of heavily contentious applications such as libquantum
and lbm.
Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 present the QoS of the co-running webservice applications
during the same set of experiments. These results show that PC3D reliably meets its
QoS targets.
Comparison to State-of-the-Art. Figure 4.11 presents the utilization achieved
by PC3D compared to ReQoS [170], an approach for reducing application contentious-
ness that employs a hybrid static/dynamic approach to introduce naps into the run-
ning application. The results shown are the average utilization improvement of PC3D
over ReQoS for a number of batch applications averaged over the entire spectrum of
CloudSuite, SPEC and SmashBench co-runners. PC3D employs a napping mecha-
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nism similar to the mechanism used by ReQoS to throttle applications when reducing
cache contention by dynamically inserting non-temporal hints is insufficient to allow
the latency-sensitive co-runner to meet its QoS target, so in several cases ReQoS and
PC3D show similar utilization levels. In a number of cases, however, PC3D gains
far more utilization than ReQoS. For example, at a 98% QoS target, PC3D delivers
over 2x the utilization of ReQoS on sphinx3 by finding an improved code variant,
leading to far lower cache contentiousness at relatively small performance overhead to
sphinx3. On average, PC3D improves utilization by a factor of 1.25, 1.45 and 1.52x
at QoS targets of 90%, 95% and 98%, respectively. Figure 4.11 also includes the co-
runner QoS, again presented as the average over the entire spectrum of co-runners.
Both PC3D and ReQoS consistently meet the co-runner QoS targets.
4.2.3 Webservice with Fluctuating Load
To further evaluates how PC3D adapts to the dynamism in the application and
its execution environment, Figure 4.12 presents the dynamic behavior of PC3D and
ReQoS as libquantum runs with web-search. The load on web-search shifts over
the course of the run, with the load pattern shown in 4.12(a). 4.12(b) shows a trace
of the performance (branches per second) of libquantum over the same time frame.
4.12(c) shows the QoS of web-search, and 4.12(d) shows the cycles spent running
the PC3D runtime.
PC3D Dynamic Behavior. libquantum initially (t=0) begins to execute along-
side web-search. PC3D continuously monitors web-search as an external applica-
tion, and detects that libquantum jeopardizes web-search QoS, so PC3D begins to
search for alternate code variants for libquantum that allow web-search to meet
its QoS while allowing libquantum to make better progress. The performance of
libquantum during the variant search is shown in greater resolution in 4.12(e). By
t=20, PC3D has arrived at an improved variant of libquantum, and PC3D allows it
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Figure 4.12: Dynamic behavior of libquantum running with web-search using the
PC3D runtime
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Figure 4.13: Average fraction of server cycles consumed by the PC3D runtime
to run with this variant until a co-phase change is detected at t=300.
At t=300, the demand placed on web-search shifts, at which point PC3D detects
a change in the behavior of web-search, causing it to revert libquantum back to
its original (no non-temporal hints) variant. Until t=600, the original variant of
libquantum runs at full speed because web-search is not sensitive to contention at
low load.
At t=600, the load to web-search picks up and PC3D again searches for an
improved variant that reduces cache contention. At t=620, the variant search ends
and the improved variant of libquantum runs until the end of the experiment (t=900).
Cycles Consumed by PC3D. A unique feature of protean code is that the work
of dynamic compilation of a host program may be offloaded to use otherwise spare
cycles on the host server, putting those cycles to work for the benefit of the running
applications. Figure 4.12(d) shows the fraction of server cycles used by the PC3D
runtime. Activity is minimal, kept to well below 1% of the server’s cycles for the
majority of the run. Two brief mini-spikes of up to 2% appear at t=0 (a higher-
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Table 4.2: Workload mixes for scale-out analysis
LS web-search, graph-analytics, media-streaming
WL1 libquantum, bzip2, sphinx3, milc
WL2 soplex, bst, milc, lbm
WL3 sledge, soplex, sphinx3, libquantum
resolution view of this spike is presented in 4.12(f)) and t=600 as PC3D generates
code to search for variants that improve the performance of libquantum.
4.2.3.1 Cycles Used by the Runtime
We highlight that this low level of overhead is not specific to this pair of appli-
cations. While the demand on the runtime to generate new variants is inevitably
a function of the optimization objective, in PC3D the CPU utilization levels of the
dynamic compiler and the entire runtime are quite low. Figure 4.13 presents the
percentage of the server’s cycles used by the PC3D runtime to manage a variety of
batch applications, which is less than 1% in all cases.
ReQoS Dynamic Behavior. Figures 4.12(b) and (c) also show the impact of
ReQoS on the same run of libquantum and web-search. ReQoS adjusts the nap
intensity, reacting to load changes at t=300 and t=600. During periods of high load
it allows web-search to meet its QoS target strictly by applying naps to libquantum,
causing libquantum to make significantly slower progress than it makes when running
with PC3D.
4.2.4 Impact of PC3D at Scale
This section discusses the impact of deploying PC3D in a large-scale datacenter
cluster that houses a mix of webservice and batch applications, showing that, by
substantially improving server-level utilization, PC3D can have a large impact on the
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Figure 4.14: Server count required to run workload mixes for PC3D vs. no co-location
number of servers needed to house a particular workload and on the energy efficiency
of the datacenter.
Server Requirements. Figure 4.14 presents an analysis of the number of servers
required to house a variety of webservice and batch application mixes. This anal-
ysis assumes a datacenter with 10k machines and the workload mixes described in
Table 4.2, with 10k instances of a latency-sensitive webservice (LS) with 95% QoS
target along with 10k batch application instances comprised equally of one of the
mixes shown in the table (WL). Running with PC3D, the 10k machines are able to
achieve a particular level of throughput on each application. Using a policy of disal-
lowing co-locations, extra servers are needed to run the batch applications to achieve
an equivalent level of throughput as the PC3D-enabled datacenter. Figure 4.14 shows
that between 3.5k and 8k extra servers are needed on top of the original 10k servers
to achieve a level of batch throughput that matches a PC3D-enabled datacenter.
Energy Efficiency. Using a large number of extra servers also has a significant
impact on the overall energy efficiency of the datacenter. Using a similar setup to the
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Figure 4.15: Normalized energy efficiency of workload mixes for PC3D vs. no co-
location
previous experiment, we employ a linear CPU utilization model to derive the power
consumption of the servers within the datacenters, from which we compute the overall
performance per Watt of each datacenter and derive energy efficiency comparisons of
the datacenters. Figure 4.15 presents a comparison of the energy efficiency of the
PC3D-enabled datacenter normalized to the No Co-location datacenter running the
same workload at the same throughput, from which we observe that PC3D improves
energy efficiency at the datacenter level by 18-34% across a spectrum of webservice
and batch workloads.
4.3 Summary
This chapter presents the design and evaluation of Protean Code for Cache Con-
tention in Datacenters (PC3D), a runtime approach to mitigating cache contention
for live datacenter applications. PC3D uses the online code transformation capability
of protean code to dynamically inserting and removing software non-temporal cache
hints, allowing batch applications to achieve high throughput while meeting latency-
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sensitive application QoS. On a spectrum of webservice and benchmark applications,
PC3D achieves utilization improvements of up to 2.8x (average of 1.5x) higher than
a recently published state-of-the-art contention mitigation runtime at a QoS target
of 98%.
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CHAPTER V
Input Responsive Approximate Computing
This chapter introduces Input Responsive Approximation (IRA), an approach that
uses a canary input — a small input carefully constructed to capture the intrinsic
properties of the original input — to automatically control how approximation is ap-
plied on an input-by-input basis for approximate programs. The key insight of this
approach is the observation that prior work on choosing how to approximate arrives
at conservative decisions by discounting substantial differences between inputs when
applying software approximation techniques. The main challenges to overcoming this
limitation lie in making the choice of how to approximate both effectively (e.g., the
fastest approximation that meets a particular accuracy target) and rapidly for ev-
ery input. With IRA, each time the approximate program is run, a canary input is
constructed and used dynamically to quickly test a spectrum of approximation alter-
natives. Based on these tests, the approximation that best fits the desired accuracy
constraints is selected and applied to the full input to produce an approximate result.
We use IRA to select and parameterize mixes of four approximation techniques
from the literature for a range of 13 image processing, machine learning, and data
mining applications. Our results demonstrate that IRA significantly outperforms
prior software-only techniques, delivering an average of 10.2× speedup over exact
execution while minimizing accuracy losses.
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5.1 The Case for Input Driven Dynamism
The ability of approximate computation to produce acceptably high-quality results
is vital to ensure that users have a positive experience and thus is one of the keys
to making approximation broadly deployable in real systems. Current techniques for
preserving result accuracy focus on the worst case, resulting in overly conservative
approximation for other cases. This section discusses the opportunity available in the
presence of a technique that dynamically monitors and controls the quality of results
for individual inputs.
5.1.1 Input Matters for Output Quality
Input is an important part of the accuracy of an approximate computation. To illus-
trate this, we detail the output quality produced by three different tiling approxima-
tions [146] of an image processing application called gamma correction [133] applied
to 800 input images. Tiling is based on the assumption that, in many application
domains such as image and video processing, elements nearby one another (e.g., pix-
els in an image) are likely to have similar values. Instead of computing each element
of the output, a tiling approximation computes a single output element and projects
that output onto the surrounding elements to form a tile. Tiling can be tuned to
trade off lower accuracy for better performance by increasing the size of the tile.
Figure 5.1 presents histograms of the output quality for 800 different images across
three tile sizes. For the purposes of illustration, we assume that the target output
quality1 (TOQ) of the approximation is 90%. As shown in the figure, for all three
tile sizes, different inputs can result in very different output qualities. For example,
across these inputs 8x8 tiling (Figure 5.1(b)) results in output qualities ranging from
1Target output quality (TOQ) is the minimum acceptable result accuracy [147], supplied by the
user of the application.
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Figure 5.1: Histograms of the accuracy of three tiling approximations applied to the
same 800 images; some mix of missed opportunities and unacceptably low accuracy
are present in each approximation
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Figure 5.2: A dynamic oracle approximation system using the most effective tiling
approximation method (fastest without violating TOQ) achieves an average speedup
of 61× and uses 42 different approximation options
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79%-99% because the assumption made by the approximation technique (that nearby
pixels are similar to one another) holds true to a different extent depending on the
composition of the input. Furthermore, we have observed that a wide range in output
quality across inputs is not unique to tiling approximation and gamma correction,
persisting across many computational problems and approximation techniques.
5.1.2 Limitations of Existing Approaches
The ubiquitous approach used in approximate computing is to choose a single approx-
imation option for some problem and apply that approximation to multiple inputs.
Existing approaches to approximation therefore suffer from a form of the problem of
aggregation, in which aggregate behavior (average or worst) is not necessarily rep-
resentative of individual behavior. In the presence of multiple differing inputs, an
approximation system that uses a single approximation across inputs either leaves
performance opportunities on the table, violates output quality restrictions, or both.
To illustrate this, we refer again to Figure 5.1, where (a), (b) and (c), are his-
tograms of the result accuracy for three increasingly aggressive approximate gamma
corrections applied to 800 input images. We assume a TOQ of 90%, and characterize
the outputs as falling into 3 classes: TOQ violating approximations (< 90% output
quality), fast + high quality approximations (90-95% output quality) and missed op-
portunities (95-100% output quality). The 4x2 tiling approximation, shown in 5.1(a),
produces minimal TOQ violations, but the speedup is limited to 5.9×. The bulk of
these output qualities can be classified as missed opportunities. A more moderate
approach, 8x8 tiling, is shown in 5.1(b). In this case, 5% of the results violate the
TOQ with a speedup of 22×. Finally, the results of an aggressive approximation are
shown in 5.1(c). This approach uses 16x16 tiling and yields 83× speedup with 30%
of the outputs violating the TOQ.
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5.1.3 The Opportunity for Dynamism
Ideally, approximation would have the best of both worlds – no missed opportunities
and no TOQ violations. This could be achieved by dynamically choosing the most
effective approximation method for each input – the fastest approximation method
that does not violate the TOQ.
To illustrate this opportunity, Figure 5.2(a) presents a histogram of output quality
over the 800 inputs using the most effective of the available approximation methods,
chosen by a dynamic oracle. Unlike the previous example, the most effective approx-
imation is always fast and high quality, never leaving performance on the table and
never violating the target output quality. Moreover, Figure 5.2(b) shows a histogram
of the speedups achieved on the set of 800 inputs. The speedups vary significantly,
ranging from 3.5× to 410× (average 61×) due to the fact that a wide range of ap-
proximations are chosen. As shown in Figure 5.2(c), across 800 inputs, 42 unique
approximation methods are chosen, with no single approximation being used on more
than 17% of the inputs. That is, a wide range of approximation methods are used to
obtain the maximally effective approximation across the set of inputs and no single
approximation is dominant. The key to taking advantage of this opportunity is to
customize the approximation for each input on an individual basis, and to develop
that customized approximation quickly.
5.2 Overview of IRA
Given a computational problem, a menu of approximation options, and an input to
the problem, the goal of Input Responsive Approximation (IRA) is to rapidly choose
an effective approximation for that input. Our approach to achieving this goal is
shown in Figure 5.3 and does the following:
1. Canary Input – first, IRA dynamically produces a canary input, a smaller
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representation of the input (Section 5.3.1). The creation of the canary is guided by
hypothesis testing, a statistical framework used to ensure that the resulting canary
is large enough to be representative of the full input, sharing key properties with the
full input, while being no larger than necessary.
2. Customize the Approximation – next, exact and approximate solutions are
computed using the canary to select the most effective from among the available
approximation options, including selecting the code regions to approximate and how
to approximate within those regions (Section 5.3.2). Because the canary input is
much smaller than the full input, IRA is able to rapidly forecast how numerous
approximations fare on a particular input by running the canary input with each of
those approximations. Unlike prior work, IRA predicts the accuracy and performance
of approximations on each input on demand and ex ante, allowing it to find and use
a customized, effective approximation for every input.
3. Compute Approximate Solution – last, the customized approximation
deemed effective for the canary is applied to the full input to produce an approx-
imate solution that is of acceptable accuracy (Section 5.3.3). As we show later, this
approach is extremely effective, leading to large performance improvements with min-
imal accuracy losses and outperforming oracle versions of prior techniques.
5.3 IRA Design and Implementation
This section provides a detailed description of how IRA develops a customized ap-
proximation for each problem input.
5.3.1 Reasoning About Canary Inputs
Creating a canary input that exhibits the properties of the full input has three main
challenges. First, in determining the similarity of the canary and the full input, we
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Figure 5.3: Exact computation and approximation with IRA
must use a definition of similarity that reflects meaningful properties of the inputs.
Second, we must be able to choose the canary in a way that is both computationally
inexpensive and ensures that the definition of similarity is satisfied. Third, we want
to choose a canary that is much smaller than the full input, as this will be a large
determinant of the time spent employing the canary to test various approximations.
A plausible approach for creating canaries could be to sample down all inputs
at the same rate. Unfortunately, this approach produces canaries that are either
(1) larger than necessary for “well-behaved” inputs, introducing extra overhead in
the approximation search process or (2) too small to adequately represent the full
input, resulting in a search that provides a misleading model of approximation ac-
curacy characteristics. Empirically, we have found that the dynamic canary creation
mechanism in IRA significantly outperforms a fixed scale-down strategy for creating
canaries. This issue is explored in greater detail in Section 5.4.2.
This work explores four different metrics of canary similarity, designed to span a
range of definitions of what it means for inputs to be similar. These metrics range from
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a very simple metric of ensuring that the values in the canary are close, on average,
with the values in the full input to complex metrics that ensure the similarity of local
properties within small regions of the input. We discuss these metrics in detail in
Section 5.3.1.3.
To address the second challenge, we ensure low overhead in the canary creation
process by employing statistical sampling in the analysis of each potential canary
input, thus allowing us to compute metrics on just a small subset of the canary
input when analyzing its similarity to the full input. To ensure that the definition
of similarity is satisfied in a chosen canary, we use a carefully designed algorithm
based on robust, automated hypothesis tests that minimize the likelihood of making
an incorrect decision about each canary. In particular, we take special care to design
our approach to avoid both false negatives – incorrectly finding dissimilarity – and
false positives – incorrectly finding similarity. These are also known as Type I and
Type II errors, respectively. The avoidance of false positives ensures that the canary
we select is highly likely to be similar to the full input.
Likewise, avoiding false negatives is key to ensuring that the chosen canary is
no larger than needed. If we mistakenly rejected a small canary that was actually
similar to the full input in favor of a larger canary, the canary-driven search can have
unnecessarily high overhead.
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Mean Variance Local Homogeneity Autocorrelation
Description
Mean µ of input Variance σ2 of Proportion Λ of elements represented by λ Correlation ρ among pairs of
elements input elements in canary /∈ [λ− σz1−α/2, λ+ σz1−α/2] input elements (yj , yj+1)
Null Hypothesis (H0) H0 : µi = µ0 H0 : σi
2 = σ20 H0 : Λi ≤ 0.1 H0 : ρi = ρ0
Alt. Hypothesis (HA) HA : µi 6= µ0 HA : σi2 6= σ20 HA : Λi > 0.1 HA : ρi 6= ρ0
Test Statistic (ti) ti =
µ0 − µi
σi
√
n
ti =
σi
2
σ20
ti =
√
n |Λi − 0.1|√
0.1(1− 0.1) ti =
ln
(
(1+ρ0)(1−ρi)
(1−ρ0)(1+ρi)
)
2
√
n−3
p-value (pi) pi = 2P (Z > ti) pi = 2P (Fn−1,n−1 > ti) pi = 2P (Z > ti) pi = 2P (Z > ti)
Sample Size (n)
n = 2(z1−α/2k Formula yields no simple form; g(x) =
√
x(1− x)
n =
4(z1−α/2k+z1−β/k)2
ln((1+ρ0)/(1−ρ0))2+z1−β/k)2 see Cohen [46] for details. n = 0.1−2(g(0.1)z1−α/2k + g(Λi)z1−β/k)2
Acceptability Test
Holm-Bonferroni method: sort p-values p1, p2, . . . pk to obtain sorted p-values p(1), p(2), . . . p(k). Find the minimum index m such that
p(m) >
α
k+1−m , then reject all canaries C(i) where i ≥ m.
α: the desired bound on the probability of committing any Type I errors (false negative), β: the desired bound on Type II errors (false positive)
Definitions
k: the number of canary candidates, Ci: the ith canary candidate, xi: the sample statistic x for canary Ci, x0: the sample statistic x for the full input
Z: the standard normal distribution, zy : the quantile function at y of Z, Fb,c: the F-distribution with degrees of freedom b and c
Table 5.1: Similarity metrics used to assess canary similarity to full input, along with the relevant statistical formulas
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5.3.1.1 Canary Construction
The algorithm for creating a canary is depicted in Figure 5.4. The inputs to the
algorithm are the desired bound on the likelihood of getting a Type II error α, the
desired bound on getting a Type I error β, and the full input to the problem. The
output of the algorithm is a small canary input deemed similar to the full input.
1 Generating Canary Candidates. First, a set of candidate canaries C1, C2, . . . , Ck
are generated. One of the key determinants of the quality of the canary is its size; a
larger canary is likely to be a better reflection of the full input than a smaller canary.
However, as the purpose of the canary is to use it in a dynamic search, a larger ca-
nary will also tend to result in a more expensive search. Our approach to generating
candidates is to expose this inherent tradeoff, using candidates of many different sizes
then choosing the smallest canary from among the candidates that is similar enough
to the full input according to one of the metrics described in Section 5.3.1.3.
We generate C1, C2, . . . , Ck such that they are regular, strided subsets of the full
input. If N is the size of the full input, we currently select canary candidates that
are size N/16,
N/32,
N/64,
N/128 and
N/256. The reason we explicitly avoid selecting
canaries larger than N/16 is that canaries that are larger may take an unacceptably
long time in the dynamic search, likely counteracting the performance gains IRA aims
to achieve by approximating the problem. For one-dimensional inputs such as arrays
of scalars or arrays of structs, an input of size 1/t is produced by taking every tth
element from the input. For two-dimensional inputs such as matrices and images, an
input of size 1/t is produced by taking every
1/√tth element along both dimensions.
This approach can easily be extended to higher-dimension inputs, however this was
not necessary for any of the test applications in this work.
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5.3.1.2 Canary Selection
The remainder of the steps in this algorithm are focused on choosing the smallest
canary from among these candidates that is similar to the full input.
2 Sample Size. We next calculate the number of samples to take from each canary
when evaluating their similarity. This calculation is designed to bound the likelihood
of getting a Type II error when comparing those properties to the full input, discussed
in further detail in Section 5.3.1.4. This sample size is denoted n.
3 Canary Statistics. We calculate the statistics needed to perform hypothesis
tests on the canaries, taking a random sample of size n from each canary Ci, then use
this to compute a test statistic for the canary ti and a p-value pi associated with that
test statistic. We discuss tests statistics and p-values in more detail in Section 5.3.1.4,
however ti is simply a statistical measurement of the similarity between the canary
and full input, while pi is the statistical significance of that measurement.
4 Canary Acceptability. Using the resulting p-values p1, p2, . . . , pk, we employ the
Holm-Bonferroni method, a technique designed specifically to bound the likelihood
of getting a Type I error when performing multiple hypothesis tests [86], to partition
the candidate canaries into two groups – those that are suitable representations of
the full input because they are statistically similar enough to it, and those that are
not.
5 Select Canary. Finally, the smallest of the acceptable canaries is returned and
used by IRA to perform a dynamic search for the most effective approximation. If
no such canary is available, IRA immediately ceases approximation and begins to
execute the exact version of the program.
5.3.1.3 Input Similarity Metrics
The purpose of the canary is to drive a dynamic search to determine how the full
input to the problem should be approximated. As such, it is of critical importance
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that the canary be similar to the full input. However, similarity can be measured in
many ways. In this work, we consider four distinct definitions of similarity.
Mean. IRA supports using the arithmetic mean of the values in the canary and
full inputs as the similarity metric. We define the mean of an input Y composed of
values y1, y2, . . . , yN as µY . For convenience, the formal definition of µY is supplied
in Equation 5.1. A canary found to be acceptable according to this metric has an
average value close to the average value of the full input.
µY =
1
N
N∑
j=1
yj (5.1)
Variance. IRA also supports using the variance of values in the input as the
similarity metric. The variance of Y is defined as σ2Y , the definition of which is
supplied in Equation 5.2. A canary that meets this standard of closeness will contain
values that are dispersed to a degree similar to the dispersion found in the full input.
σ2Y =
1
N
N∑
j=1
(yj − µY )2 (5.2)
Local Homogeneity. The canary is produced using a subset of the values in the full
input. Thus, in essence, a single value in the canary embodies a (potentially large)
number of values from the full input. To ensure the values in the canary are not highly
dissimilar to the values in the full input they are supposed to embody, IRA leverages
a measure of this dissimilarity. We denote this metric ΛY , defined by comparing
each value yj in the full input to λj, its representative value in the canary, and
calculating the proportion of those values that are at least z1−α/2 standard deviations
(see Table 5.1 for the definition of z) away from λ. The formal definition of ΛY is
shown in Equation 5.3.
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ΛY =
1
N
N∑
j=1
0 if |yj − λj| ≤ σY z1−α/21 otherwise (5.3)
Autocorrelation. Last, IRA support measuring similarity between a canary and
the full input by testing that their autocorrelations are similar. Autocorrelation is a
special case of correlation, and is a measure of how similar each value in the input is
to its neighbor. High coefficients of autocorrelation (those close to 1) indicate that
neighboring values share a linear relationship across the input, while low coefficients
(those close to zero) indicate no such relationship. Thus, autocorrelation detects
small-scale patterns in the input. For an input Y , the coefficient of autocorrelation
is ρY . We provide a formal definition of autocorrelation in Equations 5.4 and 5.5.
Y ′ = {y1, y2, . . . , yN−1}, Y ′′ = {y2, y3, . . . , yN} (5.4)
ρY =
1
σY ′σY ′′
N−1∑
j=1
(yj − µY ′)(yj+1 − µY ′′) (5.5)
5.3.1.4 Statistical Underpinnings
At its core, canary selection in IRA is built on the statistical foundations of hy-
pothesis testing, in which evidential basis for hypotheses can be weighed statistically,
allowing rejection of hypotheses that are not supported by the available evidence.
For our purposes, the hypotheses considered are statements such as canary Ci has
the same autocorrelation as the full input. Such a hypothesis can be rejected if a
comparison between the full and canary inputs does not provide sufficient evidence
to support the hypothesis. Thus, by rejecting the hypothesis equating the canary to
the full input we reject the canary. Alternatively, when the hypothesis test fails to
reject the null hypothesis, the canary is deemed to be acceptably similar to the full
input.
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It is important to note that IRA may need to consider many such hypotheses
when constructing a canary, and thus is subject to the multiple testing problem [120].
The multiple testing problem describes the situation where evaluating the validity of
multiple hypotheses increases the likelihood of incorrectly evaluating at least one of
the hypotheses. For example, consider a set of hypotheses concerning the fairness of
100 coins, the validity of which are assessed by flipping each coin 10 times and calling
those coins with at least 9 heads or tails biased. Applying this test to unbiased coins, it
is unlikely that any particular coin will appear unfair, a probability of 2.1%. However,
there is a very strong likelihood (88.6%) that at least one coin will be judged to be
unfair, an incorrect determination. Similarly, the multiple testing problem applies to
our canary hypotheses. Therefore, when evaluating canaries we adjust our statistical
methods by incorporating the Bonferroni correction for Type I errors and the Holm-
Bonferroni method for Type II errors to ensure that we avoid the multiple testing
problem. These adjustments are discussed in detail shortly.
Hypothesis Testing. In a hypothesis test, we propose two hypotheses relating
to the similarity of a canary to the full input. These hypotheses are called the null
hypothesis H0 and the alternative hypothesis HA. For each canary Ci, we construct
null and alternative hypotheses and determine whether to accept or reject Ci based
on the evidence found in favor of the null hypothesis. Our discussion will focus
on hypothesis testing for the arithmetic mean of the input, however IRA supports
several other metrics that have been discussed previously and are summarized in
Table 5.1. These other metrics can be used by substituting their equations in place
of the equations described for the mean.
A hypothesis test for the mean takes the form shown in Equation 5.6, where µi is
the sample mean of canary Ci and µ0 is the sample mean of the full input.
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H0 : µi = µ0
HA : µi 6= µ0
(5.6)
Next, the truth of H0 is evaluated by calculating and evaluating a test statistic. The
test statistic is used to produce a p-value for the test, the probability of attaining
a test statistic at least as extreme as the observed test statistic given that the null
hypothesis is true. Thus, the smaller the p-value, the lower the probability of the
observed test statistic appearing if the null hypothesis is true. Some significance
level α is chosen as a cutoff point for the hypothesis test, where p ≤ α causes the null
hypothesis to be rejected and the alternative hypothesis to be accepted. In particular,
to compute the t-statistic and p-value for the mean, we use the standard formulas
shown in Equations 5.7 and 5.8.
ti =
µ0 − µi
σi
√
n
(5.7)
pi = 2P [Z > ti] (5.8)
Standard single comparison hypothesis tests stop here, rejecting the null hypothesis
if pi ≤ α. However, we must take further steps to avoid the multiple comparisons
problem.
Controlling Type I Errors. The Holm-Bonferroni method considers multiple hy-
potheses simultaneously [86]. It outputs a set of hypotheses that are rejected, and a
set that are not, where the probability of obtaining any Type I errors is bound by
α. The method begins by sorting the p-values p1, p2, . . . , pk from lowest to highest,
resulting in a new indexing of p-values p(1), p(2), . . . p(k) corresponding to null hypothe-
ses H(1), H(2), . . . H(k). It then rejects hypotheses H(1), H(2), . . . H(m−1), where m is the
minimal index that satisfies Equation 5.9.
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p(m) >
α
k + 1−m (5.9)
The result of this method is a set of null hypotheses H(m), H(m+1), . . ., H(k) that
are not rejected, corresponding to a set of canaries C(m), C(m+1), . . . C(k) that are
acceptably similar to the full input.
Controlling Type II Errors. Given desired bounds α and β on the likelihood of
getting any Type I or Type II errors, respectively, the standard formula for computing
the number of samples needed to ensure the likelihood of getting a Type II error of
no more than β in a single comparison hypothesis test is shown in Equation 5.10.
n = 2(z1−α/2 + z1−β)2 (5.10)
To account for the multiple testing problem when using k canaries, we use the Bon-
ferroni correction [57], substituting α/k and β/k in place of α and β in Equation 5.10.
n = 2(z1−α/2k + z1−β/k)2 (5.11)
This adjusted formula requires an increased sample size over the non-adjusted for-
mula. However, sampling overhead remains reasonable even for large numbers of
canary candidates (large k) because the sample size due to this adjustment grows
sub-linearly as k increases [176].
Smallest Acceptable Canary. All of the canaries that remain from the preceding
set of steps are acceptably similar to the full input. However, it is important that
we choose the acceptable canary that results in the shortest search time in IRA’s
next step. Thus, this algorithm terminates by choosing the smallest from among the
acceptable canaries.
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5.3.2 Choosing an Effective Approximation
IRA uses the canary input to rapidly and dynamically decide how to approximate
the problem on the full input. This section describes that process.
5.3.2.1 Definition of Result Accuracy
Controlling and maintaining sufficiently accurate computation is important in ap-
proximate computing [146,147,159]. Prior work has pointed out that result accuracy
is domain, application, and context dependent [124] and includes such varied metrics
as the scaled difference between output, the peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR) or
the average absolute output accuracy. Therefore, we design IRA to be agnostic to
the specific method used to calculate result accuracy. That is, we assume only that
the application developer provides a well-defined accuracy calculation function. Our
formulation of this function Faccuracy, given two solutions Sexact and Sapprox, computes
a single accuracy metric δ ∈ [0, 1] describing the accuracy of Sapprox relative to Sexact.
Faccuracy is leveraged by IRA to compute the accuracy of a number of approximations
on the canary input, comparing them to the solution produced by the exact method
on the canary input. We assume also that the user of the application supplies a
minimum acceptable result accuracy, called the target output quality (TOQ).
5.3.2.2 Where and How to Approximate
There may be a number of code regions amenable to approximation in an applica-
tion. Consider an application with two disjoint loops that can be approximated with
loop perforation and tiling, respectively. Each such code region is an approximation
opportunity, and IRA treats each approximation opportunity as one dimension in a
multi-dimensional search space by encoding the parameters for each approximation
opportunity as a range of numerical values {1, . . . , v}. In the encoding, the value
1 has special meaning, and is used to represent the exact computation in lieu of
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Figure 5.5: Search for approximation using canary
approximation.
Furthermore, many approximation techniques may be parameterized, such as the
rate at which iterations are skipped in loop perforation or the size of one side of a tile
in tiling approximation. In such cases, numbers larger than 1 encode each value that
can be taken by a parameter. Our search algorithm makes only the assumption that
larger values correspond to more aggressive approximation (i.e., that it runs faster
but has lower accuracy). By encoding the search space in this fashion, IRA has the
option to select the exact computation at each approximation opportunity, allowing it
to choose where to approximate. By selecting between the values larger than 1, IRA
determines how aggressively to take advantage of each approximation opportunity.
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Figure 5.6: Example search for an effective approximation
5.3.2.3 Search for an Effective Approximation
IRA uses a greedy approach based on steepest ascent hill climbing [144] to tune
the parameters for the available approximations, using the approach presented in
Figure 5.5. An approximation option is defined as a point in an m-dimensional space
(d1, d2, . . . , dm), where each dimension is an encoded range of numerical values as
described in the previous section. IRA first evaluates the point (1, 1, . . . 1) on the
canary, which is the exact solution to the problem on the canary. This solution
is used as a timing and accuracy baseline, against which approximate solutions are
evaluated. Beginning at (1, 1, . . . 1), IRA then iteratively evaluates the incrementally
more aggressive value for each of the tuning parameters, computing the accuracy and
speedup relative to the exact version, then selects the increment that both satisfies
the TOQ set forth by the user and yields the steepest slope in terms of accuracy vs.
speedup. If no such increment exists, the search terminates. If such an increment
exists, it is used as the starting point for the next iteration. Upon termination, the
last valid point is returned by the search and is used to approximate the full problem
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input.
The search process runs the exact computation in addition to a number of ap-
proximation alternatives on the canary. The execution of this search typically very
fast relative to exact execution on the full input because the amount of computation
needed in regularly structured computation depends substantially on the size of the
canary, which is much smaller than the full input. We quantitatively evaluate the
time spent in the search in Section 6.4, showing that it equates to an average of 3.2%
of exact execution time on a suite of test applications.
Example. Consider Figure 5.6, which shows an example search over 3 approximation
opportunities. In step 1 we evaluate (1, 1, 1) as a baseline. In step 2, the next available
increment along each dimension is tested – (2, 1, 1), (1, 2, 1) and (1, 1, 2) in this case.
(1, 2, 1) is found to have the steepest ascent in the speedup/accuracy space, and is
used as the baseline for the next step. In step 3, (2, 2, 1), (1, 3, 1) and (1, 2, 2) are
tested, and (1, 3, 1) is found to have the steepest ascent. Finally, in step 4 (2, 3, 1)
(1, 4, 1) and (1, 3, 2) are tested. Each is found to violate the TOQ bound and the
search halts, returning (1, 3, 1) as the most effective approximation.
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Application Description Domains Input Suite
Approximation(s)
Used
CrossCorr
Measure signal/image similarity
Pattern recognition, cryptanalysis, neurophysiology 800 IMAGE
4× extrapolate,
over sliding window 1× 2D-tile
FuzzyKmeans Cluster with fuzzy cluster membership Machine learning, data mining 4 SVM 5× perforate
Gamma Apply gamma correction to an image Image processing 800 IMAGE 1× 2D-tile
GaussianFilter Apply a Gaussian filter to an image Image processing 800 IMAGE 1× 2D-tile
Integration Numeric integration of transcendentals Scientific computing, engineering 19 EQN 1× numerical approx.
Inversek2j Kinematics for 2-joint arm Robotics 90 ANGLE 4× numerical approx.
Jmeint Triangle intersection detection 3D gaming 40 TRI 1× algorithm choice
LucasKanade Optical flow estimation Computer vision 2 PERFECT 2× perforate
Kernel Estimate a probability density function Machine learning, signal processing, econometrics 2 KDDCUP 4× perforate
Kmeans Cluster points for classification Mach. learning, data mining 4 SVM 4× perforate
MatMult Matrix-matrix multiply Machine learning, scientific computing, game theory 40 PDF 2× perforate
MeanShift Apply mean shift to an image Computer vision, image processing 4 SVM 3× perforate
ScalarProd Dot product of two vectors Mechanics, machine learning, graphics 40 PDF 2× perforate
Input Suite Description
90 ANGLE Sets of angles drawn from 90 different probability distributions
19 EQN Sets of equations containing polynomials with different max degree
800 IMAGE A database of 800 images
2 KDDCUP 1999 KDD Cup data set from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [13]
40 PDF Probability dists used: beta, binomial, cauchy, chi-squared, exponential, f, gamma, geometric, hyper, log-normal, normal, poisson, t, uniform, weibull
2 PERFECT Medium and large inputs from the PERFECT benchmarks [18]
4 SVM Support vector machines from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [13]
40 TRI Sets of triangles in the unit cube, varying distributions of triangle sizes
Table 5.2: Applications and input sets used in the evaluation
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5.3.3 Putting it all Together
Final Approximation. The previous section described how IRA derives an approx-
imation method that is effective for the canary input. This approximation method,
which has been customized to be effective on the canary input, is then deployed on
the full input, producing an approximate result that is of acceptable quality.
Runtime Safety. In approximate computing, altering computation to trade per-
formance for accuracy, particularly when discarding computation, can have the effect
of changing control flow, producing unsafe intermediate results (e.g., a 0 that will be
used as the denominator in a division operation), or memory accesses that corrupt
state or result in access violations, resulting in runtime faults that were not antici-
pated by the application programmer. Prior work has shown that it is often possible
to recover from memory errors using checkpointing [158] or heap replication [20], and
from floating point errors using reevaluation or rollback [78], resuming computation
to successfully produce a result. We have experienced no such faults in our experi-
ments, however IRA can be augmented in the future to include mechanisms to guard
against these faults.
5.4 Evaluation
We evaluate IRA to examine its impact on performance and result accuracy for ap-
plications spanning a number of computational domains.
5.4.1 Methodology
Applications and Inputs. We evaluate 13 applications that use between 2 and
800 inputs. These applications cover a number of the important problem domains
that include image processing, data mining, machine learning and computer vision.
Applications and inputs are summarized in Table 5.2.
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Approximation Techniques. Our experiments bring input responsiveness to four
classes of approximation techniques. The approximation techniques themselves have
limited in terms of how they can be applied to software. For example, tiling ap-
proximation requires iterative computation on image pixels thus is applied only to
CrossCorr, Gamma and GaussianFilter, while numerical approximation requires a
library call to a math function (e.g., trigonometric functions in Inversek2j). In many
cases, multiple approximations are used side by side among an application’s code
regions. A summary of which approximations are applied to which benchmarks is
summarized in Table 5.2. The approximations techniques include:
• Loop Perforation [84,140] – loop perforation discards iterations in a loop.
We use either unadjusted perforation, in which every nth iteration in a loop is
executed, or extrapolated perforation, which is similar to unadjusted perforation
but extrapolates computed results to make up for the skipped iterations. Loop
perforation can be made more aggressive by using larger values of n. We use the
loop perforation in CrossCorr, FuzzyKmeans, LucasKanade, Kernel, Kmeans,
MatMult, MeanShift and ScalarProd.
• Tiling [146] – instead of computing each element of an output, a tiling approx-
imation computes a single output element and projects it onto the surrounding
elements to form a tile. Tiling approximation is made more aggressive by using
larger tile sizes. We use the tiling approximation in CrossCorr, Gamma and
GaussianFilter.
• Algorithmic Choice [8,55] – we use IRA to choose between five different al-
gorithmic implementations of Jmeint that offer different accuracy-performance
tradeoffs in computing whether pairs of 3D triangles intersect. The most com-
plex algorithm is the exact algorithm, while the simplest algorithm uses com-
putationally cheap heuristics that work well only when triangles are far apart.
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• Numerical Approximation [81] – we employ numerical approximation tech-
niques within Integration and Inversek2j. Integration numerically integrates a
non-integrable set of equations using the trapezoid method, which can be made
faster and less accurate by using fewer trapezoids. Inversek2j involves a motion
calculation that relies on the trigonometric functions sin(x), cos(x), sin−1(x),
cos−1(x). We approximate these trigonometric functions by using the first 1
(sin and sin−1) or 2 (cos and cos−1) terms of the function’s Taylor series in
lieu of the precise library implementation. These approximations are accurate
when x is near zero, and become less accurate farther away from zero. Thus we
can trade speed for accuracy by choosing a k such that approximation is used
only when |x| < k, making the approximation more aggressive by using larger
values of k.
Platform. All results are collected on a stock 2.4GHz Intel Xeon E5-2407v2 (Ivy
Bridge) server running Linux kernel 3.11.0. Applications are executed on the server
in serial, and task pinning is used to prevent process migration.
Error Bounds, TOQ and Accuracy. All experiments in this evaluation use
canary error bounds α = β = 0.05, thus obtaining Type I and Type II error bounds
of 0.05. TOQ values ranging from 90% to 97.5% are used in the evaluation, specified
for each experiment. IRA is agnostic to the accuracy metric, simply using the supplied
definition of accuracy (see Section 5.3.2.1) and configuring the approximation so as
to not violate the accuracy target set forth by the user. In our evaluation, we use
miss rate as the accuracy metric for Jmeint, absolute relative error for ScalarProd
and average centroid distance from the origin in Kmeans and FuzzyKmeans. For all
other applications, accuracy is defined as the average of element-wise absolute relative
error.
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Figure 5.7: Comparison of canary similarity metrics
5.4.2 Canary Construction
Similarity Metrics. Figure 5.7 presents the speedup over exact computation ob-
tained by IRA when employing each of the four canary similarity metrics described
in Section 5.3.1 at a TOQ of 90%. As the figure illustrates, the largest speedups ob-
tained are for Variance and Mean, which average 10.2× and 9.9×, respectively. The
speedups obtained when using autocorrelation are modest, averaging 4.3×, while us-
ing local homogeneity causes a speedup of 2.1×.
This is a somewhat surprising result, as the simpler metrics – Mean and Vari-
ance – perform better while achieving similarly low counts of TOQ violations (TOQ
is violated on less than 1% of inputs on average for all metrics). Closer inspection
reveals that autocorrelation and local homogeneity are more difficult similarity met-
rics to satisfy, thus they often result in either (1) choosing larger canaries, leading to
longer search times, which diminishes the overall speedup or (2) finding no accept-
able canaries, and thus no approximation being used. This is particularly true for
local homogeneity, which achieves speedups near 1 for 8 of the 13 applications. This
leads us to the insight that more complicated is not always better; autocorrelation
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Figure 5.8: Speedup and number of TOQ violations for dynamically chosen canaries
(blue star) vs. fixed-size canaries (red circles) on MatMult; all fixed size canaries
achieve lower speedup, more TOQ violations, or both
and local homogeneity reject many canaries that are deemed acceptable according to
their mean and variance, and which turned out to be perfectly adequate in searching
for an effective approximation.
A second insight revealed by this data is that mean and variance do not signif-
icantly differ from one another in terms of the canaries selected, a fact which that
holds true on average and among the individual applications. This suggests that both
metrics produce reasonable canaries and function well across a range of problems and
domains. Because variance is a slight improvement over mean in terms of the over-
all speedup of IRA, the remainder of the experiments use variance as the similarity
metric when constructing canaries.
Dynamically-Sized Canaries. Dynamically-sized canaries are valuable because
they avoid two pitfalls that could occur when creating fixed-size canaries across all
inputs. They are no larger than necessary for “well-behaved” inputs, thus keeping the
overhead low during the approximation search process, and they are large enough to
adequately represent the full input, resulting in a search that yields approximations
that are just aggressive enough for each input.
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Figure 5.10: Distribution of speedups across inputs for IRA at 90% TOQ, illustrating
the wide range of approximations dynamically chosen across different inputs; larger
speedups occur when more aggressive approximation is applied
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To illustrate this, we compare the results of using different fixed-rate canaries
within IRA for approximating MatMult to using dynamically-chosen canaries at a
TOQ of 90%. The inputs to MatMult are the set of 40 inputs described in Table 5.2,
spanning a range of probability distributions that include long tail and high variance
distributions. The results are illustrated in Figure 5.8, which shows the speedup (y-
axis) and number of inputs meeting TOQ (x-axis) achieved by IRA when using a range
of fixed-size canaries (red circles and line). As the figure shows, there is a tradeoff
between speedup and input violations to be made when using fixed-size canaries:
smaller canaries produce larger speedups but large numbers of TOQ violations, while
larger canaries produce fewer TOQ violations but smaller speedups. Improving in
both dimensions is the point illustrating the speedup (8.2×) and TOQ violations (0%)
achieved when using dynamically-chosen canaries (blue star). This demonstrates the
advantage of using dynamically-chosen canaries. A small canary is used when a small
canary can serve as a suitable representation of the full input, while a large canary is
used when a small canary cannot.
5.4.3 IRA Speedup and Accuracy
Speedup. We refer next to Figure 5.9, which presents the average speedup achieved
by IRA relative to the runtime of the exact computation across three TOQ values:
97.5%, 95% and 90%. Each application is run on all inputs, and the speedups pre-
sented are the geometric mean of speedup across the inputs. Performance measure-
ments of IRA are the end-to-end runtime, including the time to produce the canary
input, search for the customized approximation and run that approximation on the
full input. As one would expect, IRA achieves speedups that scale up as the TOQ is
relaxed, ranging from an average of 3.9× at 97.5% TOQ up to 10.2× at 90% TOQ.
Dynamism. Figure 5.10 presents boxplots of the speedups achieved across inputs
for each application at TOQ=90%. The boxplots highlight the maximum (upper
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Application
Meets TOQ
Application
Meets TOQ
(% of Inputs) (% of Inputs)
CrossCorr 790 / 800 (98.8%) FuzzyKmeans 4 / 4 (100%)
Gamma 752 / 800 (94.0%) GaussianFilter 797 / 800 (99.7%)
Integration 19 / 19 (100%) Inversek2j 90 / 90 (100%)
Jmeint 40 / 40 (100%) LucasKanade 4 / 4 (100%)
Kernel 2 / 2 (100%) Kmeans 4 / 4 (100%)
MatMult 40 / 40 (100%) MeanShift 4 / 4 (100%)
ScalarProd 40 / 40 (100%) MEAN 99.4%
Table 5.3: The proportion of inputs for which IRA hits the target output quality
(TOQ) at TOQ=90%
whisker), 75th percentile (box upper edge), median (line within box), 25th percentile
(box lower edge) and minimum (lower whisker) speedups. The large range of speedups
shown in Figure 5.10 highlights the key feature of IRA: different inputs to the same
application can be more or less difficult to approximate. IRA takes advantage of
these differences to choose the right approximation for each input and maximize the
performance that can be gained when applying approximation.
This dynamism allows IRA to realize significantly higher performance for many
cases that cannot be taken advantage of by approaches that apply one approximation
across inputs. Consider an oracle approach to choosing the single best approximation
approach across all inputs. Even with full knowledge of all inputs and how each of
the approximation options available to IRA fares on those inputs, we find that such
an oracle can achieve an average speedup of only 4.9×, as opposed to 10.2× speedup
with IRA, while delivering the same level of accuracy as IRA
Accuracy. The accuracy of the results produced by IRA is presented in Table 5.3,
showing the number of TOQ violations across inputs at TOQ=90%. On average,
IRA meets TOQ for over 99% of inputs. Furthermore, for 10 of 13 applications there
are no output quality violations, and the maximum proportion of TOQ violations is
6% for Gamma. Moreover, those cases that violate TOQ are typically not far from
TOQ. For instance, 78% of violating cases have an output quality of 88% or better
(within 2% of TOQ). From this we conclude that IRA works very well at producing
a minimal number of TOQ violations in practice, however we take care to note that
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IRA makes no guarantees about output accuracy.
5.4.4 Where is the Time Spent?
Figure 5.11 presents a breakdown of the time spent by IRA (TOQ=90%) as a fraction
of the total runtime of the exact application run. These percentages are the average
across all inputs for each application. The bulk of the time shown in the figure is
execution time saved by approximating the application with IRA. We divide the time
spent by IRA into three parts: the time spent creating a canary input (green; barely
visible), the time spent using the canary to search for an approximation (blue), and
the time spent running the chosen approximation on the full input (red).
The time spent choosing the canary is small, which is to say that the remain-
ing bottlenecks in IRA are elsewhere. Many applications – Gamma, Integration,
Inversek2j, Jmeint, Kernel, MatMult, MeanShift and ScalarProd – spend a small
proportion of the time searching for the the approximation, while many others spend
a sizable fraction of time doing so. When a large amount of time is spent in the
search, this is caused by a combination of large canaries and high-dimensional search
spaces (that is, those that have a larger number of approximation opportunities to
explore).
The size of the approximation search spaces varies significantly across applica-
tions, ranging from 4 in the case of Jmeint (4 versions of the algorithm constitute
the search space) to 22,500 in the case of CrossCorr where 5 approximation options
are parameterized. Our hill climbing algorithm takes O(m*n) steps, where m is the
number of approximations to parameterize and n is the number of ways to parame-
terize a single approximation. In our experimentation, we have found that searches
often end in fewer than 10 steps and typically take no more than a few dozen steps,
ultimately resulting in searches that average 3.2% of exact execution time.
The search time for choosing the approximation might be reduced by paring down
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Figure 5.11: Breakdown of time spent by IRA, showing time to create the canary
(barely visible), search for the approximation, and run the chosen approximation on
the full input
the number of approximation opportunities and parameter ranges to reduce the size of
the search space. For example, if certain approximation opportunities were revealed
through static analysis, offline profiling, or feedback from earlier runs of IRA to result
in ineffective approximations for a substantial fraction of inputs, those opportunities
could be discarded. However, because the goal in this work is to automate the process
of choosing the approximation without the aid of offline profiling or analysis, we
implement no such feedback loop.
5.4.5 Comparison to Prior Work
Green [15] and SAGE [147] are two state-of-the-art calibration systems that dynam-
ically tune approximation to control TOQ violations. Green uses profiling in concert
with calibration at fixed periods to tune how aggressively to apply approximation.
SAGE is also calibration-based, however it is entirely dynamic in nature and it contin-
ually changes the calibration period as more inputs are seen, lengthening the period
when calibration shows that the current tuning of the approximation does not violate
TOQ.
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Figure 5.12: Comparison of IRA to calibration-based approximation with Green [15],
SAGE [147], showing that IRA achieves more than 4× speedup of each
We compare IRA to using oracle versions of the SAGE and Green runtime systems
to choose approximations. Our implementations of the SAGE and Green runtimes
do two things perfectly that cannot be done in practice. First, calibration on an
input yields the precise speedup and accuracy for that input on all approximations,
allowing the approximation to be tuned to exactly the most effective approximation
at each calibration point. Second, calibration intervals for each approach are set by
an oracle for each application. For Green, the best calibration interval is used out
of all possible calibration intervals, and for SAGE both the best calibration interval
and calibration adjustments are used. Thus, our experiments are upper bounds for
the speedups achievable on these applications, inputs and approximation techniques
with Green and SAGE.
We compare IRA against the oracle Green and SAGE by holding the number
of TOQ violations achieved by each approach constant and examining the speedups
achieved. The results of this comparison are shown in Figure 5.12, which shows the
speedup of the three techniques where the TOQ violations are held constant at the
TOQ violations IRA achieves at 90% TOQ. IRA improves the performance by an
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average of 10.2× by customizing the approximation to each individual input, while
oracle Green speeds up by an average of 2.2× and oracle SAGE speeds up by a factor
of 2.3×.
There are a number of applications for which the oracle Green and SAGE pro-
vide no speedup, such as MatMult and ScalarProd. This occurs because some of
the application inputs have high variance or long tails, making them very difficult to
approximate. For these applications, Green and SAGE get locked into unnecessarily
conservative approximation approaches for a series of inputs once calibration has been
done on a difficult input. IRA, on the other hand, employs conservative approxima-
tions on these difficult inputs while applying appropriately aggressive approximation
on others. On LucasKanade, Green and SAGE achieve more speedup than IRA. This
occurs because LucasKanade can be aggressively approximated on all inputs, thus
allowing Green and SAGE to calibrate once and run those aggressive approximations
for all input, whereas IRA spends valuable time searching for an approximation on
all inputs.
5.5 Summary
This chapter described Input Responsive Approximation, an approach for automati-
cally configuring approximation of regularly structured computations for each prob-
lem input. IRA accomplishes this by producing a canary input at the problem outset,
a reduced version of the full input rigorously chosen so as to retain the properties of
the full input. This canary is used to rapidly test and choose from among the available
approximations. We use IRA to approximate 13 image processing, machine learning,
data mining, and computer vision applications. Using these applications, we showed
that IRA achieves an average speedup of 10.2× at a target output quality of 90%, far
higher than idealized versions of state-of-the-art prior work.
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CHAPTER VI
Online Code Transformations in the Operating
System for Increased Security
This chapter describes the motivation and design of a novel operating system
architecture with an online code transformation capability for increased security. We
show that this code transforming operating system, ProtOS, can be used to design a
new class of protections that undermine code reuse attacks by employing continuous
code re-randomization. Continuous code re-randomization constantly re-positions
and reorganizes a program’s executable bytes while the program runs, thwarting an
important class of execution hijacking attacks by leaving attackers unable to exploit
assumptions as to the location and structure of code in memory.
ProtOS introduces the robust code transformation power of a dynamic compiler
into the OS, enabling a new class of security techniques. This novel design allows the
OS to continuously transform executing code with low overhead on arbitrarily com-
plex native programs. Hosting the code re-randomization technique in the operating
system has the security advantage of protecting critical structures used for runtime
code transformations.
The operation of the code re-randomization service is illustrated in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1(a) shows execution of a process over time using a conventional system
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 (a) Conventional OS that uses fixed, randomized code locations
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(b) ProtOS uses continuously re-randomized code locations
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Figure 6.1: ProtOS thwarts code reuse attacks by using its online code transformation
capability to continuously re-randomize code as the program runs
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architecture that leaves code locations fixed throughout execution. Figure 6.1(b)
depicts the code re-randomization service in ProtOS, which continuously iterates
over the code in the program, leveraging a robust dynamic compiler to generate re-
randomized variants of program code. Our evaluation of ProtOS shows that it can
re-randomize program code frequently enough to resist state-of-the-art code reuse
attacks based on memory disclosures and side channels with modest performance
overheads that average 9% across a wide range of applications.
6.1 Why a Code Transforming OS?
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is a technique that randomizes
the position and contents of code and data once as the application begins running.
Coarse-grain forms of ASLR are implemented in most modern operating systems, ran-
domizing the position of certain segments at load-time. The main limitation of ASLR
in the presence of sophisticated code reuse attacks is its static nature, only random-
izing code once at the beginning of execution, which results in a lack of protection
throughout an application’s lifetime. A defensive capability that offers continuing
protection during an application’s execution is needed to defend against such attacks.
The primary insight underlying the need for a code transforming OS is that con-
structing code reuse attacks takes time, ranging from hundreds of milliseconds to
minutes and even weeks [154,156,162]. Thus, if the locations of executable code can
be changed between the point in time when memory becomes visible to the attacker
and the point in time when the attacker has successfully constructed the attack based
on that knowledge of memory and begins deploying it, the attack will not succeed.
In other words, these attacks can be thwarted by a practical mechanism for dynam-
ically and continuously re-randomizing code. There are challenges in designing such
a mechanism for online code transformation – that mechanism must itself be secure,
transparent, robust and efficient. To overcome these challenges, this work proposes a
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compiler-empowered operating system architecture than can continuously transform
running application code.
6.1.1 Decoupled Application and Compiler
Classical approaches to dynamic compilation and optimization are based on vir-
tualization, whereby the application and dynamic compiler are tightly coupled at
runtime and control passes back and forth between them to allow the compiler to
generate code and control execution. Even without performing any code transforma-
tion, the most of efficient of this class of systems introduces 20-30% overhead just to
possess the dynamic compilation capability [30]. Instead, our approach is based on
protean code. The key element in the design of protean code is that it decouples the
dynamic compiler from the application to allow the application to run at near-native
speeds (< 1% overhead) while the compiler works in parallel to generate and stitch
in code without requiring access to the original source code. We thus design a system
that spawns a dedicated lightweight dynamic compilation process as it spawns the
application process, which runs in parallel to the application and transforms its code
as they both execute.
6.1.2 OS-Hosted Online Code Transformation
The dynamic compilation process thus acts as a transparent service (that is, the
application needs no knowledge of it) that transforms application code as it runs.
This design of dynamic compilation as a transparent service is essential for keeping
the dynamic compiler from being subverted or disabled, and by building the dynamic
compilation capability into the operating system we are able carefully construct it to
protect critical structures in the dynamic compiler.
Unlike userspace dynamic compilation, a dynamic compilation process in our sys-
tem architecture is designed specifically to avoid interaction with other processes
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and subsystems. For example, it has no input beyond the process ID and metadata
of the host program, supplied by the kernel when invoking the dynamic compiler.
It has no environment variables, ignores signals generated by other userspace pro-
cesses, performs no device I/O, and only interacts with the file system when loading
dynamically-linked libraries (see Section 6.2.4). Thus, file I/O can be avoided entirely
by static-linking programs. Avoiding these interactions as much as possible is partic-
ularly important for designing security mechanisms such as code re-randomization,
as it minimizes the attack surface of the dynamic compilation process and makes it
difficult for attackers to leverage the dynamic compilation capability in attacks.
6.1.3 Beyond Security
Beyond the security focus of this chapter, an enhanced system architecture with
an online code transformation capability opens up a new design space for other as-
pects of the OS. The OS hosts a number of services that can benefit from a dynamic
compilation capability to improve performance. For example, a task scheduler could
transform application code online to share resources more effectively [103, 169, 170]
or to dynamically invoke core-specific optimizations in heterogeneous multi-core sys-
tems as it moves tasks among cores with different capabilities [45, 74]. Similarly, a
memory manager could use page management policies in concert with online code
transformation to improve the performance or predictability of the TLB [14,93,134].
6.2 ProtOS System Architecture
This section describes the design and implementation of ProtOS, our realization
of a code transforming operating system. We describe the main elements of ProtOS
and how it extends a traditional system architecture to include a code transformation
capability. These extensions are described in the context of our prototype implemen-
tation of ProtOS on top of Linux/x86 64, though the concepts involved are generic
105
ProtOS
binary
file
ELF  
loader
dynamic 
complier
file 
system networking
memory 
management
dynamic 
loader
thread 
scheduler
Linux kernel
(b) ProtOS system architecture
ELF  
loader
file 
system networking
memory 
management
dynamic 
loader
thread 
scheduler
Linux kernel
(a) Conventional system architecture
dynamic compilation 
process application process
application process
ELF 
binary
file
Protos
loader
Figure 6.2: System architecture of ProtOS
and make minimal assumptions about the underlying system.
6.2.1 Overview
Figure 6.2 contrasts the design of ProtOS with a conventional system design. We
highlight the modifications to the existing system architecture in the figure, which
primarily include a light-weight dynamic compiler and an extended program loader.
The ProtOS loader is an extension to the existing ELF loader in Linux that sets up
the binary, configures a dynamic compilation process, then launches that dynamic
compilation process alongside the application. Throughout application execution,
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Figure 6.3: Overview of ProtOS runtime system. All program execution occurs from
the code cache, a shared memory region between the program and the compiler. The
dynamic compiler runs asynchronously to update the code cache
the dynamic compiler spawned by ProtOS provides online code transformation as a
transparent service to the application, acting on native application binary in memory
with little overhead. We describe the compiler component and the loader in further
detail in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3, respectively.
6.2.2 Online Code Transformation
The online code transformation facilities in ProtOS are based on the techniques
described in Chapter III. First, at compile time, the direct calls in the program are
virtualized (refer to Figure 3.1), a step that provides points at which the applica-
tion’s execution can be dynamically controlled. As we show later, this virtualization
step introduces negligible runtime overhead. When an application compiled this way
runs, a dynamic compilation process executes alongside to generate and stitch in
newly produced code, shown in Figure 6.3. The dynamic compilation process places
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newly compiled code into a code cache, a region of memory shared between the host
application and the dynamic compiler. When the new code is ready for execution,
the dynamic compiler simply overwrites the target of the relevant virtualized call in-
struction. The decoupling of the application and compiler has significant performance
advantages over conventional, fully-virtualized dynamic compilation.
Another important feature of ProtOS’s dynamic compilation mechanism over con-
ventional dynamic compilation is that a conventional dynamic compiler operating in
the same process as the program is often forced either to violate the W ⊕ X paradigm
(described in detail in Section 2.4) or sacrifice performance. Consider a code page
housing newly minted code from the dynamic compiler that is also in the near-term
execution path of the program. The compiler must either sacrifice performance by
toggling W and X permissions on the page between code writes and execution, induc-
ing TLB flushes, or sacrifice security by leaving the page WX while code is written to
the page. Decoupled dynamic compilation in ProtOS, on the other hand, runs the
program and compiler in separate processes uses separate permissions for code pages
in each process – RX for the program, RW for the dynamic compiler – obviating this
tradeoff.
6.2.2.1 Edge Virtualization Table
The targets of compiler-virtualized calls are organized into a structure in the bi-
nary called an edge virtualization table (EVT) to provide a convenient mechanism for
new code to be stitched into the running program. This structure somewhat resem-
bles the global offset table (GOT) used in stock dynamically-linked ELF programs
to house the locations of shared library procedures. Unlike the GOT, however, the
EVT provides the location of every function in the host program. For the sake of
efficiency, it must be easily accessible to the host program, and thus by necessity it
provides a neatly organized list of function addresses that, if compromised, could be
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used by attackers to gain a tremendous amount of insight into the current memory
layout of the program’s code.
Our approach to mitigating this possibility is to continuously re-randomize the
locations of each individual EVT entry as the application runs. Randomizing the
locations of all EVT entries makes the location of any particular EVT entry extremely
difficult to guess, and if one such location is divulged through an information leak it
does not improve the attacker’s prospects for finding any of the other entries.
Another difference between the EVT and the GOT is that the GOT is typically
writable in program memory (the dynamic loader, running in userspace, modifies it),
while the EVT resides in the code cache, which is RX in the program. As a result, the
EVT is not easily amenable to control flow hijacking attempts based on overwriting
its entries from the program.
6.2.2.2 Program Metadata
Another part of the compilation process in ProtOS is to enhance the binary,
placing a minimal metadata section into the program binary to facilitate the dynamic
compiler. The metadata section contains the compiler’s intermediate representation
(IR) of the program along with a map of the locations of code and data structures
such as functions, call sites and variables. These are leveraged when ProtOS initializes
the dynamic compiler process to allow it to find and modify these structures as it
recompiles the running program. The metadata is not mapped into program memory.
Furthermore, prior to allowing the program to begin the dynamic compiler performs
a priming recompilation once to produce a new, randomized code layout, thus the
code-related metadata is useful before the application executes but becomes stale
once the application has begun execution.
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6.2.2.3 Garbage Collection
ProtOS destroys earlier versions of code that reside code cache so that they cannot
be leveraged by attackers. There are lazy and strict models of garbage collection
implemented in ProtOS. Our lazy garbage collector destroys code and EVT entries
that are no longer reachable by the application. Thus, lazy garbage collection can be
done with near-zero overhead because the program never has to be stopped while the
garbage collector runs. The down side of this approach is that it does not guarantee
strict timing bounds as to when that code will be reclaimed.
Strict garbage collection immediately collects all but the most recent version of all
code and EVT entries, thus this approach bounds the time that any particular byte
remains in the same place in executable memory. The design and implementation of
strict garbage collection is less trivial than lazy, as it must atomically update program
state when more than one version of code is reachable simultaneously. Consider a
partially executed function foo (i.e., it is stacked and control will return to it) that
needs to be garbage collected, and another copy foo’ that will replace foo. In strict
garbage collection, when foo is reclaimed the dynamic compiler must modify the
architectural state (memory and registers) referring to foo to reflect this change.
The state referencing foo includes function pointers, jump tables, global offset table
(GOT) entries, and goto labels, which must be updated to reflect the switch from foo
to foo’ when foo is garbage collected. The program is stopped during this portion
of garbage collection, as the switch from foo to foo’ must be atomic with respect to
the program’s architectural state to guarantee correct execution.
Particularly challenging in the design and implementation of strict collection is
the handling of function pointers in programs. To address this challenge, the dynamic
compiler tracks the locations of function pointers in memory using an approach similar
to the one outlined by Bigelow et al. [24] and updates them as needed during garbage
collection. Our current implementation of strict garbage collection in ProtOS sup-
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ports the typical uses of function pointers, handling the spectrum of applications used
in our evaluation. For more atypical uses involving custom-encoded function pointers
that are difficult to track dynamically, ProtOS would have to revert to more costly
mechanisms such as runtime address translation as described in prior work [30,110].
All of the experiments and discussion in the remainder of this chapter assume the
strict model of garbage collection because the focus of this work is on providing the
most secure execution environment to undermine code reuse attacks.
6.2.3 Program Loading
ProtOS uses a custom loader, outlined in Figure 6.2, that extends the conventional
ELF loader in several ways, and is designed with interoperability between conventional
ELF binaries and ProtOS-enabled binaries in mind, seamlessly allowing the two to
coexist in the same ecosystem. The specific steps taken at load-time are as follows:
1. Read Binary File — the loader first reads the program’s binary file. If the
file contains the proper metadata, the loader treats the file as ProtOS-enabled.
Otherwise, the file is treated as a normal ELF binary by passing it along to be
loaded by the conventional ELF loader.
2. Setup Program and Compiler — the loader next initializes the program
process, setting up the process as usual, except that the program’s original text
segment is replaced by a larger code cache segment for dynamic compilation.
This code cache is also mapped into the dynamic compiler process.
3. Configure Permissions — the loader then configures permissions for the
program and its compilation process, setting the shared memory region to RX
on the program side and RW on the compiler side. The compiler process is
configured to allow it to ptrace only the specific application process paired with
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Figure 6.4: Sample address space layout of ProtOS application
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it, allow it to pause, inspect and resume the program to perform management
tasks such as garbage collection and failure notification.
4. Priming Recompilation — next, the compiler process launches as the pro-
gram remains inert. The compiler performs a priming recompilation, random-
izing the locations of all functions and EVT entries in the program. This step
is equivalent to enacting a strong form of ASLR on the program’s code before
it begins execution. Note also that, like stock Linux, we perform segment-wise
ASLR on the stack and heap segments for every program.
5. Begin Program Execution — when the priming recompilation has finished,
the dynamic compiler allows the program to proceed with execution.
A typical address space layout resulting from the ProtOS loader is depicted in Fig-
ure 6.4. In 6.4(a), we illustrate the address space layout of a process resulting from
the stock ELF loader and in 6.4(b) we illustrate the layouts of the program and com-
piler processes after being loaded with our custom loader. The key differences are
(1) that a dedicated dynamic compilation process has been spawned to run alongside
the program and (2) that the program contains none of its original code, instead hav-
ing a code cache – a region of memory shared with the compiler process from which
execution will occur – initialized with a randomized code layout.
6.2.4 Dynamically-linked Libraries
Dynamically-linked libraries can cause new code to be introduced into the applica-
tion’s address space at any point during execution. ProtOS is designed to gracefully
handle ProtOS-enabled libraries in addition to legacy libraries.
The dynamic compilation process stubs out all procedure linkage table (PLT)
entries in the program to intercept the first call to a shared library. At dynamic load
time, ProtOS allows the application to load the shared library using the conventional
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dynamic loader, then before allowing the program to continue execution locates the
library file and checks whether it is a legacy library or a ProtOS-enabled library by
checking for the existence of ProtOS metadata in the library. If the library is legacy,
the program is allowed to continue execution without the benefit of the library being
managed by the dynamic compiler. If the library is a ProtOS-enabled library, the
dynamic compiler performs a priming recompilation and emits randomized library
code into the program’s code cache and destroys the original library code in memory.
The randomized library code is subsequently managed by the dynamic compiler as
though it were code from the program executable.
Conventional dynamically-linked library code pages can be physically shared among
all the running processes that have loaded the library. A consequence of our ap-
proach to handling dynamically-linked libraries is that a unique copy of code from
ProtOS-enabled shared libraries is present in the address space each ProtOS-managed
program. As with conventional dynamically-linked libraries, data pages remain phys-
ically shared.
6.3 Continuous Code Re-randomization
Building on the online code transformation capability of ProtOS, we implement
a novel, practical code re-randomization service that continuously re-positions and
reorganizes program code, thwarting code reuse attacks by leaving attackers unable
to make assumptions about the locations of bytes in memory.
Two forms of re-randomization are supported – a medium-grain approach that
randomizes the location of each function, and a fine-grain approach that also ran-
domizes the order of blocks within functions. Medium-grain re-randomization makes
code reuse attacks difficult, placing a burden on the attacker to (1) discover the lo-
cation of the function, (2) construct an attack and payload, and (3) execute their
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Figure 6.5: Different mixes of medium- and fine-grain re-
randomization offer different resource/security tradeoffs
attack, all within a very short time window. Fine-grain re-randomization places an
additional burden on the attacker because it also means they are unable to reliably
assume that the function’s structure remains fixed. Thus, even the discovery of the
function’s location may yield limited benefit to the attacker because they must also
discover the function’s current structure.
Two parameters define an overhead vs. security tradeoff in the re-randomization
service. First is the length of time between rounds of program-wide re-randomization
– shorter time between rounds provides increased protection against attacks but has
higher resource overhead. Second is how often to use the fine-grain technique – fine-
grain is more compute intensive but offers additional security over medium-grain. A
diagram illustrating how the medium- and fine-grain approaches apply to a single
function is presented in Figure 6.5.
The re-randomization service operates on the program by iteratively stepping
through its functions, incrementally generating a re-randomized version of the pro-
gram in the code cache. When the new program version is created, the compiler
pauses the program, garbage collects the old version, finally resuming execution in
the new version. These operations execute in a loop, continuously re-randomizing
program code throughout execution.
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6.3.1 Medium-grain Re-randomization
The steps taken to enact medium-grain re-randomization are depicted in Fig-
ure 6.6. 6.6(a) shows the call graph of a sample program with three functions. 6.6(b)
shows an initial randomized memory layout of the program. The specific steps taken
during a program-wide round of re-randomization are as follows:
1. Randomize EVT — first, the dynamic compiler chooses randomized locations
for a new set of EVT entries, placing each new entry alone in a random location
in the code cache. The coming steps will generate code that contains references
to this new set of EVT entries, which are initialized to the addresses of the
currently-executing versions of all functions and will be updated to point to
new versions of each function as those new versions are generated.
2. Re-position Functions — the dynamic compiler chooses a function and se-
lects a location for it randomly from among the free portions of the code cache
that meet the size and alignment constraints of the compiler. The compiler
then emits a new version of the function and places it into the code cache. Fi-
nally, the EVT entries for that function are updated to reflect the location of
the new version of the function. Figure 6.6(c) shows the sample program af-
ter one function has been re-randomized. This function-level re-randomization
proceeds until new versions of all program code reside in the code cache. This
state is depicted for the sample program in Figure 6.6(d).
3. Pause Program Execution — it is important to note that the program runs
continuously throughout the previous steps. However, at this point the dynamic
compiler pauses program execution to perform garbage collection.
4. Garbage Collection — garbage collection is performed, clearing away the old
version of code and updating architectural state to ensure that no remnants of
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the old versions remain in the program, such as a return address to a call site in
one of the old functions (see Section 6.2.2.3 for a detailed discussion of garbage
collection). Figure 6.6(e) reflects the result of garbage collection in the sample
program.
5. Resume Program Execution — the program resumes, now with fully re-
randomized code and EVT entries.
6.3.2 Fine-grain Re-randomization
The steps taken to enact fine-grain re-randomization are similar to medium-grain
re-randomization, however, instead of generating an identically-structured copy of
each function as discussed above in Step 2, the dynamic compiler generates a new
version with a re-randomized basic block order in addition to a re-randomized function
placement. ProtOS allows medium- and fine-grain re-randomization to be mixed in
arbitrary proportions by allowing the code re-randomization service to be configured
with a parameter p ∈ [ 0, 1 ]. For every re-randomization, a fine-grain approach is
used with probability p and medium-grain is used with probability 1− p.
Our implementation of fine-grain block-level reordering uses a compiler pass that
randomizes block order. Because this step invokes numerous passes in the com-
piler to perform the block re-ordering and generate optimized code, the production
of new code for fine-grain re-randomization uses significantly more CPU resources
than medium-grain re-randomization. We quantify the impact of this overhead in
Section 6.4.5.
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6.3.3 Bytes, Bytes, Everywhere1
When initialized, the code cache is filled with trap instructions, 0xCC in our x86 64
implementation. Moreover, upon freeing a region of memory previously held by an
EVT entry or code, the dynamic compiler fills the region with trap instructions.
Thus, all unused regions of the code cache are filled with trap instructions. This not
only causes the unused areas of the code cache to be useless to attackers, but also
allows ProtOS to catch would-be attackers in the act. That is, the execution of one
these traps may result from a failed code reuse attack stemming from an attacker’s
outdated conception of what resides in program memory.
However, execution of a trap may also be the result of a buggy program. When
the execution of one of these trap instructions is detected, execution of the program
halts, which is detected by the dynamic compiler (the program PC is in an unused
region of the code cache). The dynamic compiler then alerts the operating system
to the failure of the program and the possibility of an attack, thus allowing further
measures to be taken, for example, by dumping program state to disk, alerting an
administrator, or writing a log message.
6.4 Evaluation
We now evaluate ProtOS, with particular focus on the resource overhead of the
code re-randomization service and on using gadget detection software [145] to demon-
strate the transient nature of gadgets in memory resulting from re-randomization.
6.4.1 Methodology
ProtOS is built into Linux kernel 3.13.0. The underlying hardware used in our
experiments is a 16-core Intel Xeon E5-2630v3 (Haswell) with 2-way SMT, 64GB
1Here we refer to the line from Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s Rime of the Ancient Mariner – “water,
water, everywhere, nor any a drop to drink”
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RAM and a 2.40GHz clock rate, which uses the x86 64 ISA.
We implement the ProtOS compilation infrastructure on top of LLVM version
3.3, a widely-used production strength open source compiler [101]. All programs
are compiled to support ProtOS and are statically linked against a ProtOS-compiled
version of the musl implementation of libc [1]. We choose musl because it builds
easily with LLVM, whereas GNU libc contains a significant amount of code sup-
ported only by the GNU compiler. Our return oriented programming (ROP) gadget
detection experiments use ROPGadget version 5.3 [145] with a maximum gadget size
of 20 bytes.
The evaluation uses programs representing a spectrum of domains and com-
putational characteristics that stress the performance of ProtOS and its code re-
randomization service, including programs that are compute- and memory-intensive,
have large code bases, and large instruction working sets. In particular, we use the fol-
lowing 22 programs — bwaves, bzip2, lbm, mcf and namd from SPEC CPU2006 [80];
gmm and stemmer from SiriusSuite [79]; barnes, fft, lu cb, lu ncb, ocean cp, ocean ncp,
water nsquared and water spatial from Splash2x [22]; blockie, bst, er-naive,
naive, sledge from SmashBench [115]; blackscholes and freqmine from PAR-
SEC [23].
6.4.2 ProtOS System Overhead
We begin by evaluating what it costs to have the code transformation capability
in ProtOS. We compare the runtime of ProtOS programs to their non-ProtOS coun-
terparts compiled to ELF binaries and running on a stock Linux. The ProtOS-based
experiments involve no dynamic code transformation; the program is launched along-
side an inert dynamic compilation thread that immediately goes idle and makes no
modifications to the program. Thus, the main source of overhead is to execute indi-
rect calls through the EVT in the ProtOS-compiled programs instead of direct calls in
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Figure 6.7: ProtOS programs show negligible slowdowns compared to programs on a
stock Linux system
the conventional Linux/ELF programs. As the figure shows, the overhead of running
ProtOS-compiled programs is negligible, having a maximum performance overhead
of 1.7% and an average performance overhead of 0.3%. This shows that there is very
little performance overhead just to use the basic ProtOS system architecture with a
code transformation capability.
6.4.3 Code Re-randomization Performance
Offering continuous runtime support in thwarting code reuse attacks without in-
troducing significant runtime overheads is a challenging problem. The most closely
related techniques that attempt to provide such protection are in the area of con-
trol flow integrity, where the most comprehensive techniques have overheads of 2-
5× [39, 52]. These levels of overhead are too high for users to bear and serve as a
barrier to their adoption. A primary feature of our code re-randomization approach is
that it transparently provides a more secure execution environment while introducing
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Figure 6.8: Performance overhead of the medium-grain re-randomization service in
ProtOS; 300ms offers an attractive design point, in that it re-randomizes fast enough
to thwart state-of-the-art code reuse attacks [156,162] with only 9% runtime overhead
minimal overhead.
Re-randomization Frequency. We conduct experiments to examine the perfor-
mance impact of the re-randomization service as a function of the re-randomization
frequency. Figure 6.8 presents the results, showing the runtime of each program
at a range of different re-randomization frequencies ranging from 30ms to 30s when
exclusively using medium-grain re-randomization. The runtime results in this experi-
ment are normalized to the execution time of the stock ELF/Linux program, and are
inclusive of all sources of overhead.
The overhead of code re-randomization increases as the re-randomization becomes
more frequent. We examine the sources of overhead in more detail shortly. The
performance overhead is below 5% at all frequencies larger than 1 second. Moreover,
the performance overhead of re-randomizing once every 300ms averages 9%. As we
discuss shortly, a frequency of 300ms thwarts current state-of-the-art ROP attacks
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Workload A bst, gmm, lu ncb, water spatial
Workload B bzip2, er-naive, stemmer, lu cb
Workload C mcf, naive, blackscholes, barnes
Workload D blockie, sledge, fft, water nsquared
Table 6.1: Multiprogram workloads
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Figure 6.9: Throughput of multiprogram workloads; throughput suffers small degra-
dations even when re-randomizing all 16 co-runners in a fully subscribed system every
300ms
by reducing them to blind guessing about where gadgets reside in memory. Finally,
we point out that ProtOS has a significant resilience to advancements in the speed
of code reuse attacks, in that it can re-randomize code once every 30ms to (over 10×
faster than necessary to thwart modern attacks) while incurring an overhead of only
31%.
Multiprogram Workloads. To investigate the impact of using re-randomization
every 300ms for all applications on a highly subscribed system, we conduct experi-
ments on re-randomizing multiprogram workloads. We use the workloads described in
Table 6.1, which are run either in isolation (1 workload implies 4 co-running applica-
tions), in pairs (8 co-running applications) or all at once (16 co-running applications).
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Our experimental setup is to launch a set of co-running applications, running every
application in a loop for 30 minutes while collecting the average execution time of
each application. From these execution times, we compute the weighted speedup rel-
ative to the solo execution time of the applications on the stock ELF/Linux system.
We then compare the weighted speedup of ProtOS to the stock Linux system.
The results are shown in Figure 6.9. The left side of the figure shows the through-
put achieved for 4-way co-runner experiments, the middle shows 8-way, and the right
shows 16-way. The degradation due to co-running applications on the conventional
system increases as the number of co-runners increases due to the additional dynamic
compilation processes and the associated interference they cause for shared resources
such as caches and memory bandwidth. For 4-way co-running the throughput degra-
dation is as low as 5%. For the 16-way co-running case, recall that the hardware
platform has 16 CPUs, and thus for 16 co-running applications each CPU with 2-
way SMT is subscribed running an application process and a dynamic compilation
process. Nevertheless, the 16-way co-running case shows an overhead of only 19%,
demonstrating that our technique remains practical even when deployed on multipro-
gram workloads in heavily subscribed systems.
6.4.4 Sources of Application Overhead
We quantify the sources of overhead in re-randomized applications by first measur-
ing the direct overhead imposed by the dynamic compiler in pausing the application
to perform garbage collection. Figure 6.10 presents the average overhead across ap-
plications along with the average of overhead from all other sources. As the figure
shows, garbage collection overhead is negligible at longer frequencies, becoming more
significant at shorter frequencies and rising to 9% when re-randomization occurs every
30ms.
Dynamically Generated Code Quality. Visible in Figure 6.10 is an overhead of
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Figure 6.10: Overhead of garbage collection
3% when re-randomizing code every 30 seconds. Referring back to Figure 6.8, we ob-
serve that barnes, stemmer, water nsquared and water spatial exhibit slowdowns
of 9-20% when re-randomization occurs every 30 seconds.
Figure 6.11 shows the results of an experiment where we re-randomize applications
only once at the beginning of execution and collect the dynamic instruction counts
during the run using hardware performance monitors. The figure plots a point for
each application whose position along the x and y axes are its execution time overhead
and dynamic instruction count overheads, respectively. This figure shows that there
is an very strong correlation (the co-efficient of correlation is ρ = 0.89) between
these two factors. Further investigation reveals that in certain instances, our dynamic
compilation infrastructure generates code that is bloated relative to the code produced
by the static compiler in some key hot code locations. Thus, these programs end up
executing more instructions than their statically-compiled counterparts. While our
dynamic compilation infrastructure based on LLVM is very mature and generates
highly optimized code, this highlights the importance of continued work in developing
125
Execution Time Overhead w/ 1 Re−randomization
−10% −5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
−10%
−5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Ex
tra
 D
yn
am
ic
 In
str
uc
tio
ns
barnes
blackscholes
bst
freqmine
namd
ocean_cp
stemmer
water_nsquared
water_spatial
Figure 6.11: Dynamically-generated code instruction count vs. application runtime
overhead; correlation between the two is p=0.89
126
the LLVM dynamic compiler.
Side Effects. The remaining performance overheads in re-randomized applications
result from architectural and microarchitectural side effects. These side effects include
(1) the impact on instruction cache and TLB from executing re-randomized versions
of code that reside in different locations at different points in time and (2) contention
for resources like last level cache and memory that the dynamic compiler process
shares with the application.
To assess the impact of these side effects, we profile the dynamic activity of a
number of hardware performance monitors during application runs and find that TLB
misses show significant differences between 300ms re-randomized applications and
stock applications. Figure 6.12 presents dynamic traces of four hardware performance
monitors measuring important aspects of the memory subsystem collected during
native runs of mcf on stock Linux, as well as during re-randomized runs on ProtOS.
mcf is a memory-intensive application, and thus we expect it to be sensitive to data
cache interference. However, data cache effects are barely noticeable while the TLB
misses per cycle in Figure 6.12(d) are significantly higher during re-randomized runs.
Nevertheless, the performance impact of these side effects amounts to just an 8%
overhead on mcf and a 7% overhead on average across all applications.
6.4.5 Medium vs. Fine-grain Re-randomization
We now compare the resource overheads of medium-grain and fine-grain re-randomization.
Fine-grain re-randomization provides additional security benefits over medium-grain
re-randomization. It places an additional burden on the attacker because it means
they cannot make assumptions about the structure of functions, and thus the discov-
ery of part of the function may have limited benefit in locating additional ROP gadgets
because the function’s structure is not known. However, fine-grain re-randomization
requires more compute resources to generate code because it invokes a series of com-
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piler passes that randomizes the block order and optimizes the resulting code before
emitting machine code.
CPU Utilization. We examine the CPU resource requirements of fine-grain
re-randomization through a series of experiments shown in Figure 6.13 that use 8
mixes of fine-grain and medium-grain re-randomization. A particular mix of fine-
and medium-grain re-randomization is characterized by p, the probability that fine-
grain re-randomization is applied (medium-grain is used with probability 1− p). For
each mix we re-randomize applications as frequently as possible, a frequency limited
by how quickly the CPU can perform re-randomization rounds. As the figure shows,
the more fine-grain re-randomization is used, the less frequently re-randomization
can be applied to the entire program. Our experiments show that 0% fine-grain
(100% medium-grain) re-randomization can be applied every 0.03s, while mixes that
use 1%, 10% and 100% fine-grain can be applied every 0.15s, 1.45s, and 14s, re-
spectively. A useful mix of the two is to use fine-grain re-randomization sparingly
(e.g., with probability 1-2%), imposing minimal extra resource overhead and allow-
ing re-randomization to occur with high frequency, while also burdening attackers by
breaking the assumption that function layouts remain fixed throughout an applica-
tions lifetime.
Dynamic Behavior. Figure 6.14 illustrates the activity of the re-randomizer by
showing the locations of gadgets within er-naive throughout its run. The experiment
used to generate this illustration dumps the contents of the code cache to disk after
each round of re-randomization, which is then scanned for ROP gadgets using the
ROPGadget tool [145]. This example is scoped down to include only four of the
functions in er-naive (there are well over 2000 functions in the entire program,
including those from libc). The figure shows the locations of gadgets in the address
space of er-naive. Each function contains a number of ROP gadgets, so to simplify
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Figure 6.12: Dynamic memory behavior of mcf with and without re-randomization;
the key factor impacting performance when re-randomizing code is frequent TLB
invalidations
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Figure 6.13: Tradeoff between frequency and granularity of re-randomization
the presentation we plot a single point rather than a cluster of points to represent
the gadgets in each function.
We annotate the figure to show the positions of a subset of gadgets within main
during several stages of the run. Between the first and second annotations, medium-
grain re-randomization is performed, changing the location of the function and gad-
gets but preserving the structure of the function and relative positions of many gad-
gets. Between the second and third annotations fine-grain re-randomization changes
the function layout, thereby also changing the relative positions of many gadgets
within the function.
6.4.6 Security Implications
Re-randomization makes the locations of ROP gadgets unreliable to attackers.
This unreliability is central in undermining the ability of ROP attacks to rely on
the locations of gadgets in the construction of a code reuse attack. To measure this
unpredictability, we again dump the contents of the program’s executable memory
130
er-naive::main select gadgets
BB4 idiv [rdx+10];call  …
    mov edx,10;call rax
BB6 add [rsi+7],bh;mov  …
    mov esi,7;mov edx,1 … 
BB1 clc;xor al,al;call r9
    xor al,al;call r9
BB5 pop rdi;pop rbp;jmp …
    pop rbp; jmp rax
BB2 mov edx,1;call rax
BB3 mov edi,-1;call rax
Re-randomization Round
Of
fse
t in
 C
od
e C
ac
he
gadgets after medium-grain
BB4 idiv [rdx+10];call  …
    mov edx,10;call rax
BB6 add [rsi+7],bh;mov  …
    mov esi,7;mov edx,1 … 
BB1 clc;xor al,al;call r9
    xor al,al;call r9
BB5 pop rdi;pop rbp;jmp …
    pop rbp; jmp rax
BB2 mov edx,1;call rax
BB3 mov edi,-1;call rax
gadgets after fine-grain
BB4 idiv [rdx+10];call  …
    mov edx,10;call rax
BB2 mov edx,1;call rax
BB3 mov edi,-1;call rax
BB5 pop rdi;pop rbp;jmp …
    pop rbp; jmp rax
BB1 clc;xor al,al;call r9
    xor al,al;call r9
BB6 add [rsi+7],bh;mov  …
    mov esi,7;mov edx,1 … 
Figure 6.14: Gadgets detected within 4 functions of er-naive; memory is dumped
after each round of re-randomization and gadgets are detected offline using ROPGad-
get [145]
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Figure 6.15: Likelihood of individual ROP gadgets remaining in place long enough to
orchestrate an attack; at 300ms, re-randomization occurs rapidly enough to prevent
even a single ROP gadget from remaining in place long enough to be usable in state-
of-the-art ROP techniques
region and use ROPGadget to extract the available ROP gadgets from the executable
memory region at different points in time and compute the average likelihood across
applications and gadgets that any particular gadget remains in place after different
amounts of elapsed time.
Our findings from these experiments are presented in Figure 6.15. The likelihood
of finding a ROP gadget at its current position at any particular point in time in
the future approaches zero as time elapses, regardless how (in)frequently the code is
re-randomized. This matches the intuition of how the re-randomization works; when
selecting new locations for re-randomized code, the locations are chosen at random
from within the code cache. Thus, re-randomizing code at any frequency implies that
all ROP gadgets will eventually be moved or destroyed.
Moreover, re-randomizing code every 300ms offers a very attractive design point.
It introduces a modest amount of performance overhead (9% on average), and re-
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randomizes code frequently enough to undermine state-of-the-art ROP attacks. Con-
sider the just-in-time (JIT) code reuse attack, which requires at least 500ms to ex-
ecute and end-to-end ROP attack by repeatedly exploiting memory disclosures to
dynamically build a map of the executable code in the application [162]. When
a frequency of 300ms is used, our code re-randomization implementation will have
re-positioned every gadget while the attack is being orchestrated, making such an
attack extremely unlikely to succeed. Similarly, recently published work has demon-
strated that side channels may be used to infer the contents of executable memory
when certain programming constructs are present in the program [156]. In the fastest
form of their technique, leaking a single byte can take as little as 1.3 seconds, which
our re-randomization service can undermine easily by re-randomizing code once per
second.
6.5 Summary
This chapter motivates and describes ProtOS, a novel system architecture that
hosts an online code transformation capability as a system service. Using this on-
line code transformation service, we design and evaluate a mechanism for performing
continuous code re-randomization to undermine code reuse attacks. Our experiments
with ProtOS demonstrate the feasibility of this unique conception of code trans-
formation as a system service. We show also our re-randomization technique can
re-randomize code frequently enough to mitigate state-of-the-art code reuse attacks
with modest performance overheads that average 9% across a broad range of appli-
cations.
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CHAPTER VII
Conclusions and Future Directions
This dissertation motivates and proposes a new approach to enabling online code
transformations, allow executing native programs to be transformed as they run.
The approach works by allowing a dynamic compiler to run asynchronously and in
parallel to the running program, thus keeping the runtime overhead of possessing an
online code transformation capability to near-zero and allowing programs to execute
with this capability at near-native speed. The capability to continuously perform
online code transformations opens up a new design space for native programs, as such
programs no longer need to have a fixed implementation throughout their execution.
I demonstrate these opportunities by describing three novel applications of on-
line code transformations, resulting in best-in-class solutions to several challenging
problems facing computer scientists today. First, I use online code transformations
to improve the utilization of multicore datacenter servers, significantly reducing the
number of servers needed to host latency-critical web services to mitigate the cost and
environmental impacts of operating datacenters. This technique strategically injects
software cache hint instructions into a running application to allow the applications
housed on the server to cooperatively use shared server resources far more effectively
than prior techniques that lack the online code transformation capability. Second,
I build a technique to automatically configure and parameterize approximate com-
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puting techniques for each program input. This technique results in the ability to
configure approximate computing to achieve an average performance improvement
of 10.2× while maintaining 90% result accuracy, which significantly improves over
oracle versions of prior techniques. Third, I leverage online code transformation to
thwart code reuse attacks, a class of attacks that are widely used today by malicious
attackers to subvert and hijack the execution of software systems. This technique
builds an online code transformation capability into an operating system (OS), thus
allowing the OS to efficiently, transparently and continuously re-randomize code in-
side running applications, invalidating attackers’ assumptions as to the location of
code in memory that are needed to successfully execute a code reuse attack.
Beyond these opportunities, the introduction of a low-overhead online code trans-
formation technique can have wide-reaching implications, impacting the future of
hardware and software design.
7.1 Software Adaptation
The introduction of a low-overhead online code transformation technique that al-
lows software to be dynamically manipulated can be used to employ many classes
of optimizations whose efficacy depends on the application’s runtime environment,
broadly defined as the set of internal and external states in which the application
runs (e.g., other running applications, performance/power/resilience constraints, or
the application’s input). Examples of this include cache tiling, thread-level paral-
lelism, instruction scheduling, hardware and software prefetching [95], duplication,
and the application of approximate computing techniques. Similarly, online code
transformations could be used to enact short-lived profiling or instrumentation, al-
lowing quick bursts of feedback about performance or other interesting characteristics
of application behavior.
Beyond the security focus of Chapter VI, an enhanced system architecture with
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an online code transformation capability opens up a new design space for other as-
pects of the OS. The OS hosts a number of services that can benefit from a dynamic
compilation capability to improve performance. For example, a task scheduler could
transform application code online to share resources more effectively [103, 169, 170]
or to dynamically invoke core-specific optimizations in heterogeneous multi-core sys-
tems as it moves tasks among cores with different capabilities [45, 74]. Similarly, a
memory manager could use page management policies in concert with online code
transformation to improve the performance or predictability of the TLB [14,93,134].
The low overhead approach to online code transformations could also be used to
apply additional security measures such as Control Flow Integrity protections [4] and
software diversity [175] into running application code. Such measures could be used
selectively during periods of elevated threat, or used on-demand in response to a
security-related event (e.g., a process that may be malicious begins to run).
7.2 Hardware Design
By providing a mechanism to dynamically change the running code, online code
transformations make possible a number of dynamic software compilation strategies
that have the capacity to influence the way we think about designing hardware.
The ability of software to adapt to and take advantage of architectural knobs ex-
posed by the hardware to fine-tune the behavior of the hardware means that such
knobs should be more readily exposed by hardware designers. One example of the
importance of such knobs is evidenced by the system described in Chapter IV that
takes advantage of non-temporal prefetch instructions to optimize co-running data-
center applications.
Energy efficient execution on top of existing and emerging microarchitectural fea-
tures can be leveraged more successfully using online code transformations. For ex-
ample, instructions could be dynamically scheduled (reordered), achieving schedules
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that bring the performance of superscalar in-order cores closer to that of out-of-order
cores. Such an optimization could radically increase the performance of in-order cores
and make them a more performance-competitive design.
Moreover, the ability to transform code to avoid unreliable or failing architectural
units (e.g., a certain functional unit) may encourage the adoption of low-voltage or
otherwise unreliable designs. Similarly, heterogeneity and accelerator designs may
be facilitated by online code transformations, which can be used to generate highly
optimized and specialized code that take advantage of the unique features offered by
such designs.
The capability to easily transform code may also have implications for increasing
the adoption of increasingly thread- and data-parallel hardware. For instance, the
runtime compiler may be able to guarantee that certain dependence conditions hold in
a particular execution environment (e.g., due to the peculiarities of the input) that do
not hold generally, and may find parallelization opportunities not available to a static
compiler. Alternatively, the runtime compiler could find a number of opportunities
where such dependencies are usually true, resulting in an upsurge in parallelization
opportunities that could effectively use architectural speculation support, leading to
faster adoption of that support.
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